William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 7 (2016)
Issue 2

Article 4

March 2016

Chinese Regulation of Issuer Earnings Forecasts:
Recommendations for an Ex Ante Legal Framework
Chengxi Yao

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Repository Citation
Chengxi Yao, Chinese Regulation of Issuer Earnings Forecasts: Recommendations for an Ex
Ante Legal Framework, 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 459 (2016), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmblr/vol7/iss2/4
Copyright c 2016 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

CHINESE REGULATION OF ISSUER EARNINGS
FORECASTS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN
EX ANTE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
CHENGXI YAO*

We would not think much of a military general staff
or intelligence staff which told the field commander
they were not going to give him their estimates as to
the enemy's strength and dispositions for fear they
might not be accurate or complete, but would prefer to
give him something that they were sure was reliable,
like information about the enemy's dispositions in
World War II.
-Homer Kripke (1972)1
[T}he securities laws typically do not act as a Monday

Morning Quarterback.
-Stransky v. Cummins Eng. Co., lnc. 2

• Professor, Financial Regulation, Shantou University Business School,
People's Republic of China; Juris Doctor, Boston College Law School; LL.M.
with Distinction in Securities and Financial Regulation, Georgetown Univer·
sity Law Center. I am grateful for the valuable comments by the Editorial Board
of the William & Mary Business Law Review, and by Professor Allan Horwich
of Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Sidney Davidson, The Study Group on Objectives of Financial Statements:
A Progress Report, 1973 STANFORD LECTURES IN ACCOUNTING 5, 8--9 (June 1,
1973) (quoting Homer Kripke, Proceedings, New York State Bar Association
Meeting (Jan. 27, 1972)).
• 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995).
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INTRODUCTION

Economic theory suggests that corporate disclosures and enhanced information quality reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors, and between informed and uninformed
traders. Reduction in information asymmetry in turn mitigates
adverse selection, thereby increasing the firm's stock liquidity in
the secondary market and lowering the firm's cost of capital in the
primary market. a Empirical studies of the Chinese markets and of
the U.S. markets both find that management earnings furecasts4...._
one of the most informative corporate disclosures5-affect stock
prices. 6 In the United States, to encourage issuer disclosure of
s &e, e.g., Anne Beyer, Daniel Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys & Beverly R. Walther,
The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J.
AcCT. & EcoN. 296 § 3.2.2.2 (2010); Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure,
32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, § 4.1 (2001).
4 The AlCPA distinguishes a "financial forecast" from a "financial projection,"
defining the former as a presentation of management's expectations of financial position based on assumptions it expects to materialize, and the latter as
one given one or more hypothetical assumptions. A "financial forecast" is appropriate for "general use," whereas a "financial projection'' would normally be
appropriate for "limited use." See AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS § 301.08(c)-{d) (2001), http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standarda/Audit
Attest/DownloadableDocuments/AT-00301.pdf [https://perma.cc/73B3-JV5W];
AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION chs. 3--4 (2013). For the

purpose of regulatory treatment, the terms "forecast," "projection," "prediction,"
and "estimate" may be used interchangeably in this Article. See, e.g., Public

Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Performance and
Related Subjects, Exchange Act Release No. 9844 (1972); Beecher v. Able, 374
F. Supp. 341, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (2016); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3b-6(c) (2016); 15 U.S. C. § 77z-2(i)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2012).
5 See Sarah B. Clinton, Joshua T. White & Tracie Woidtke, Differences in the
Information Environment Prior to Seasoned Equity Offerings Under Relaxed
Disclosure Regulation, 58 J. ACCT. & ECON. 59, 64 (2014); see also Homer Kripke,
The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1151, 1197-201 (1970).
B For literature studying the U.S. stock markets, see, for example, Paul M.
Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure,
and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature, 31 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 405, 425 (2001). For literature studying the Chinese stock markets, see, for example, Yihong Jiang, Xun Tong & Xia Yang, Information Content of Earnings Forewarnings, 5 CHINA ACCT. & FIN. REV. 145, 146, 162 (2003);
Liang He, Issuer Earnings Forecasts: Market Reactions and Regulation,

462 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459
projections and other forward-looking information, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1979 adopted a safe harbor
rule under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) respectively. 7 Noting
that the SEC safe harbor rules had "not provided companies meaningful protection from litigation," Congress enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) to both "discourage" frivolous litigation and "encourage" issuer dissemination
of forward-looking statements. a
Under the dichotomy of the mandatory/voluntary forwardlooking disclosure regime in the United States, reporting issuers
are required to make the forward-looking disclosures specified in
Item 303 of Regulation S-K, ''Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (l\1:D&A).9
The MD&A must be included in the issuers' registration statements filed under the Securities Act; the registration statements,
§§ 3.1, 3.5 (May 2005) (Ph.D clissertation, Southwest University of Finance and
Economics, China). But see Mei Luo & Yunling Song, How Credible Are Managers' Earnings Forecasts in the Chinese Market?, 9 FIN. RES. 168, 169, 179
(June 12, 2012); Xinsheng Cheng, Youchao Tan & Yu Cheng, Management

Forward-Looking Disclosures: Have They Reduced Information Asymmetry?,
39 J. FIN. & ECON. 42, 51 (2013).
7 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2016); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2016); Safe Harbor
Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, Exchange Act Release
No. 15,944, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,814 (July 2, 1979). For a history of the SEC's
positions with respect to issuer projections prior to its adoption of the safe harbor, see HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG.,
REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N A-265, app. X-A: Evolution of SEC Policies and Practices Regarding
Projections (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter SOMMER REPORT].
• See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stet. 737 (1995); Securities Litigation Reform Conference Committee Report,
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 49 n.29 (1995). In 1998, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), to prevent using
State courts to frustrate the objectives of the PSLRA See Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
For literature studying PSLRA, see LoUIS Loss, JOEL SEIJGMAN & TROY
PAREDES, 10 SECURITIES REGULATION ch.ll.D.4g n.510 (5th ed. 2014). For literature studying SLUSA, see id. ch.ll.B.lO n.ll5.
• 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016). For a description of the historical origin of
I tern 303, see Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange
Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,716 (Apr. 24, 1987).

i
i
i
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duty to disclose, 16 and the contrast between fraud prohibition
and mandatory disclosure.I7 Analyzing the relationship between
nondisclosure-based Item 303 violations and antifraud violations,
the literature views some case law as rejecting an automatic
finding of an antifraud violation based on an Item 303 violation
and other case law as holding that Item 303 violations can be,
could be, or might be the basis for an antifraud violation.JS Two
recent decisions, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley and In re
NVIDIA Corporate Securities Litigation, however, do not appear
to demonstrate any substantive conflicts among the circuits on
the issue than a facial linguistic divergence.I9
materiality should vary with context: in a clisclosure context, materiality simply
prohibits lying and half-truths; in an insider trading context, materiality bars
insider's secret trading profits and thus should be of a more exacting standard;
in a 10b-5 implied right of action context, materiality functions similar to the
common law tort action for misrepresentation; in contrast, in Bcu;ic, the Court
defined materiality in a free-standing context).
16 See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose
Under Rule lOb-5, 57VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1644-45 (2004). Materiality refers to
whether a piece of information would likely be important to the reasonable investor, whereas duty refers to whether there is a duty to disclose the information.
ld. at 1644. Not all material information must be disclosed; on the other hand,
immaterial information may be required to be disclosed. ld. at 1645. For example, not every piece of information required in an issuer's periodic reporting is
going to be important to investors in every instance. Id. at 1645 n.18. See also
Brian Neach, Note, Item 303's Role in Private Causes of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NarRE DAME L. REv. 741, 752--53 (2001) (arguing that
Item 303's two-pronged disclosure standard does not purport to determine
whether or not particular information is material; it only imposes on management a duty to disclose specified information that may or may not be material).
17 See, e.g., Joseph Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for
Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223, 230--32 (2002).
Disclosure regulation can be divided into fraud prohibitions and mandatory
disclosures: fraud prohibitions are designed to eliminate deception in disclosure
and mandate accuracy; mandatory disclosures impose affirmative content-based
disclosure obligations. ld.
18 See cases cited by Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1648 n.25,
1650-53 nn.35-36, 38, 42; see also cases cited by ROBERT BROWN, THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 2A-72-73 nn.358--61.1, 362 (3rd ed. 2013).
19 Compare Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100--01 (2d Cir.
2015) (concluding that a failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q
filing can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim only if
(i) the omission satisfies Basic's probability/magnitude test for materiality,
and (ii) all of the other requirements to sustain a Section 10(b) action, including

i

i
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safe harbor rules do not expressly impose a "duty to update"
condition, 25 its interpretation of the "reasonable basis" requirement for earnings projections effectively incorporates such a
duty. 26 While the statutory safe harbor rule expressly declares
that "[n]othing in this section shall impose upon any person a
duty to update a forward-looking statement,"27 it stops short of
providing an exemption from antifraud liability for failure to
update a forward-looking statement that was accurate when
insider trading; statute or regulation requiring disclosure; and inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior diaclosures); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321-22 (2011):
[I]t bears emphasis that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) do not create
an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information. Disclosure is required under these provisions only when
necessary 'to make ... statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.' ...
Even with respect to information that a reasonable investor
might consider material, companies can control what they have
to disclose under these provisions by controlling what they say
to the market.
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2016), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2016).
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (2016); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections,
supra note 7, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,813. As with "duty to update," the SEC similsrly adopts a straddling position on "duty to disclose assumptions" underlying
a projection. See, e.g., Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, Exchange Act Release No. 15,305,
43 Fed. Reg. 53,246, 53,248 (Nov. 15, 1978):
[T]here may be instances where reasonably based and adequately presented projections would significantly add to the mix
of information availsble to investors in the absence of disclosure
of underlying assumptions .... [U]nder certain circumstances
the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be material to an
understanding of the projected results .... [D]isclosure of the
projection without this information might be misleading.
Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, supra note 7, at 38,812:
While the Commission has determined to follow the Advisory
Committee's recommendation that disclosure of assumptions
not be mandated under all circumstances, ... [t]he Commission
also believes that the key assumptions underlying a forward
looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure
may be necessary in order for such statements to meet the
reasonable basis and good faith standards embodied in the
[safe harbor] rule.
27 15 U.S. C. § 77z-2(d) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (2012).
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made but has become inaccurate due to subsequent events.2s
Judicial decisions stay divided on the existence and scope of
such a duty 29 --divisive enough to have caused concern over
whether a snapshot act would trigger a motion picture production
obligation.ao Academic literature relies upon the corporate ''halftruth" doctrineat as the foundation for "a narrow and limited
duty to update" theory.a2
28 See, e.g., John Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 992
(1996); Robert Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule JOb-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 28 (1998); BROWN, supra
note 18, at 1-00.
29 See, e.g., Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: ''Are We There
Yet?': 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 148-49 (1999) (noting that disagreement exists
among the federal circuit courts as to whether the duty exists at all: the
Seventh Circuit says no; the First, Second, and Third Circuits say yes, and
among those circuits that say yes, there is disagreement as to the breadth and
limits of the duty); Steven Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and
Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225, 232 (2002) (observing that the other circuits, specifically the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh,
have opted not to directly confront the question of whether a duty to update
exists). See also Stuart Cohn & Erin Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities
Class Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation
of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 940 n.l51 (2010) (pointing out that
the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements post-dates much of
the litigation in this area and that the safe harbor's lack of reference to updating projections suggests that projections initially protected under the safe
harbor provisions would not lose their protection by virtue of subsequent events.
However, this issue has not been judicially resolved.).
30 See Carl Schneider, Duty to Update: Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require
the Commencement of a Motion Picture?, 3 INSIGHTS 3 (Feb. 1989) (commenting
on frequently cited duty-to-update cases); Oesterle, supra note 29, at 143 (stating
that a robustly applied duty to update doctrine can in effect approximate a continuous disclosure obligation).
31 See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1098 (1991)
(describing a corporate disclosure that is literally true but misleading due to
a material omission as nothing more than "a half-truth"); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.408 (2016), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.10b-5(b) (2016).
32 Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 118-20 (2000) (applying
the half-truth doctrine to the prior forward-looking statement), with Gregory
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In contrast to the voluntary earnings projection regime in the
United States,aa the Chinese securities regulation applies a bifurcated mandatory/voluntary earnings projection regime and
includes both types of projection disclosure in the public disclosure system.34 As the first study published in a U.S. law journal
comprehensively examining the Chinese projection regulatory
policies and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange listed
issuers' projection practices, in light of disclosure theories in U.S.
accounting, economics, and legal literatures, this Article contributes to the extant literature on regulation of issuer projections and more broadly of issuer forward-looking information.
Following this introduction of motivating disclosure theme and
a review of U.S. legal literature on mandatory and voluntary
disclosure, Part I of the Article explores the origins and characteristics of issuer mandatory/voluntary earnings projection practices in China against the historical evolutions of the Chinese
stock market. Part II discusses the Chinese disclosure and enforcement policies governing issuer earnings projections, benchmarked to disclosure theories in accounting and economics

Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public Company
Disclosure and the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2199, 2251--{;5 (2000) (applying the half·truth doctrine to the present disclosure);
see also THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12.9[10] (2015) ("When projections are made there is no implication that they
will be updated. Instead, the only implication is that they were made on a rea·
sonable basis and in good faith.").
33 The Wheat Commission in 1969 recommended that the SEC's long·
standing policy banning projections in issuers' SEC filings not be changed. See
SEC, DISCWSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 95--96 (1969) [hereinafter WHEAT
REPORT]. The Sommer Commission in 1977 reversed the Wheat Commission's
recommendation, and opted for a policy of encouraging issuer disclosures of pro·
jections and material underlying assumptions. SOMMER REPORT, supra note 7,
at 344-45. Since 1978, the SEC has adopted a voluntary projection policy.
Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, supra
note 26, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,248.
34 For the bifurcated mandatory/voluntary earnings projection regime in the
securities offerings context, see Part LA, infra; in the significant corporate as·
sets restructuring context, see Part I.B, infra; in the listed issuer periodic and
current reporting context, see Part I. C, infra.
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literature, SEC Regulation S-K Item 10(b) "Commission Policy
on Projections," and U.S. legal theories.
Extending SEC Regulation S-K Item 10(b) to the Chinese
setting, Subpart II.A critiques the current disparate and fragmented projection regulation among the stock exchanges and
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It recommends
integrating issuer public projections into a CSRC centrally administered public disclosure system that provides a transparent and
level playing field for state-controlled and private entrepreneurcontrolled issuers. Departing from Item 10(b)'s controversial "duty
to update" concept, however, Subpart II.A recommends an economic efficiency-based voluntary disclosure policy. To fill a critical void in the Chinese legal and disclosure systems, Subpart II.B
imports two key features from the U.S. systems for being equally
important and relevant to the Chinese issuers and investors
under an institutional setting of predominant state-ownership of
capital markets: issuer safe harbor protection versus investor
private right of action; and fact versus opinion distinction in
determining fraud liability. It recommends an ex ante legal
framework with balanced public-private enforcement, to improve upon the current ex post, Fidelity regulation-based, solely
public enforcement. In conclusion, disclosure recommendations
based on U.S. legal and economic theories are highlighted in two
dimensions: those uniquely applicable to the Chinese market,
and those of potential common interest to Chinese and U.S. disclosure systems.
I. TRIGGERS OF ISSUER EARNINGS FORECAST DISCLOSURES

A. IPO and Earnings Projection Disclosure
Following the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1990,35
consistent with its planned economy philosophy transplanted to
35 About Us, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., http://www.sse.eom.cn/aboutus/sse
introduction/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/YAR9.J64D]; About Us, SHENZHEN
STOCK EXCH., http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutuslbsjslbsjj/index.shtml [https:/1
perma.cc/LJ29-5AUH].
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the capital markets, China's central planners adopted an Annual
IPO Offering Allowance in 1993, which was superimposed with
an Annual IPO Issuer Quota in 1996.36 The Offering Allowance
fixed the total face value of stock shares to be floated for the year,
regardless of the actual offering proceeds. The Issuer Quota set the
number of issuers to go IPO in a year. 37
A regime of mandatory earnings projections by IPO issuers was
instituted in 1993, when China's first Company Law (1994) and
the State Council's Provisional Regulation of Securities Offerings
and Trading (1993) mandated that IPO issuers make and disclose
their earnings projections for the forthcoming year in the IPO
prospectus.3B The IPO offering price was set by a formula supplied
by the CSRC along the following form; issuers were to project
earnings within the confines of given regulatory formulations;
36 State Council, SC 1993-112: Provisional Regulation of Securities
Offerings and Trading, art. 12(2) (1993), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/tlb
/tlfg/xzfg_8248/200802/t20080227_191560.html [https://perma.cc/PX8F-3VEF]
(imposing Offering Allowance requll-ement); Office of the State Council, OSC
1996-37: National Securities and Futures Work Plan for 1996 § 2 (1996)
(Westlaw China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China)) (imposing Issuer Quota requll-ement).
The Issuer Quota was superimposed on the Offering Allowance to address local
governments' avoidance of Offering Allowance by reducing the offering allowance per firm through reverse stock splits and increasing the number of issuers in their localities. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1995-162: Notice of
Dispositions of Certain Issues Related to Stock Offerings § 1 (1995) (Westlaw
China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China)).
37 SC 1993-112, supra note 36, arts. 22--23; OSC 1996-37, supra note 36. See
also CIDNA SEC. REG. COMM'N & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR 2013-23: STOCK
OFFERING REFORM-A COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 10-12 (2013), http://www
.sse.com.cn/researchpuhlicationsljointresearcblclc_20130305_3686457.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/5J7Z-MX7V].
38 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 1993-16: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 137(4) (1994) (Westlaw China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China))
[hereinafter CoMPANY LAw 1994]; SC 1993-112, supra note 36, art. 15(9); see also
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1993-39-Att2: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. !-Prospectus (Provisional), ch. 3 § 19 (1993) (Westlaw China
]J:f;ll: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1997-2: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. !-Prospectus, ch. 3 § 19 (1997) (Westlaw China
]J:f;ll: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-131: Notice Concerning Prospective Issuers and Their Auditors (2000) (Westlaw China ]J:f;l!:
(Westlaw China)).

l
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Clllna's first Securities Law (1999) introduced a legal Verification and Approval System, replacing the administrative Offering
Allowance and Issuer Quota System. 42 The evolving Verification
and Approval System has incorporated increased market elements
since 2004: (1) it allows greater roles for the managing underwriter
to select, sponsor, and recommend IPO candidates to the CSRC,
replacing the government's direct selection of issuers under the
Offering Allowance and Issuer Quota Systems;43 and (2) it authorizes a book-building process to determine the IPO price, which
no longer is set or need be approved by the CSRC. 44
6 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 453 (1998) (sampling A-share IPOs listed on the SHSE
during the December 1990-December 1993 period, and fincling an average of
289 percent IPO underpricing and significantly positive excess market returns
of overpriced A-share IPOs persistent for over 350 days, indicating a real rather
than speculative phenomenon).
42 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 1998-12: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 14-15 (1999) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China))
[hereinafter SECURITIES LAw 1999]; see also China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC
2001-48: Guidance for Managing Underwriters in Connection with Stock Offerings, arts. 1-2 (2001) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)).
43 The market-oriented underwriter sponsorship procedure under the Verification and Approval System evolved from the earlier government allocationbased underwriting deal quota procedure under the Offering Allowance and
Issuer Quota System. For a regulatory history, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
CSRC 2003-18: Provisional Regulation of Sponsorship for Securities Offering
and Listing (2004) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg.
Comm'n, CSRC 2004-1: Notice of Implementation of "Provisional Regulation of
Sponsorship for Securities Offering and Listing," , 5 (2004) (Westlaw China 7Jj$:
(Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Securities Offering and Listing
Sponsorship Procedure: A Significant Reform (2003), http://www.csrc.gov.cn
/pub/newsite/fxjgb/gzdt/200701/t20070108_69302.html [https://perma.cc/KV76
-BDPM]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2009-63: Regulation of Sponsorship
for Securities Offering and Listing, arts. 2--3 (2009), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub
/newsite/fxjgb/baxyjg/bjflfg/20 1308/t20 130823_232989.html [https://perma.cc
/2K6M-85TR].
44 Book-building commenced as an experiment in January 2005, and gradually evolved to become market-based IPO pricing and allocation mechanisms.
For its regulatory history, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2004-162: Notice
Concerning Certain Matters Related to an Experimental Book-building Process for Initial Public Offerings (2005) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China));
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Offering Exam. & Verif. Memo. No. 18: Regulatory
Requirements Applicable to Institutions Participating in IPO Book-Building
Process (2004), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/fxb/shbzbwl/200412/t200412
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As a threshold matter, however, firms' access to the IPO

market fundamentally remains a central planning model, from
China's first Securities Law (1999) to its current Securities Law
(20 14). Before a firm is eligible to file a "preliminary prospectus,"
it must file an "application prospectus," which is "examined and
verified" by CSRC's functional offices and an Offering Examination and Verification Committee (Offering E&V Committee), composed of the CSRC-designated outside technical advisors and
CSRC staff liaison.45 The application prospectus procedure is a
means for the government to determine, importantly, the applicant
firm's "ability for achieving sustained profitability." Such ability
is to be assessed based on criteria including "whether material
changes have occurred, or will likely occur, to the business model
of the applicant or to the business environment of the industry
sector of the applicant, with material adverse effects on the applicant's ability for achieving sustained profitability."46 The CSRC
approves or disapproves the firm's IPO application considering the
Examination and Verification Opinion rendered by a panel of the
Offering E&V Committee, 47 and giving deference to the decisions
13_69344.html [https://perma.cc/36XN-4KVX]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC
2006-37: Regulation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, ch. 2 (2006)
(Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 201069: Regulation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, art. 5 (2010) (Westlaw
China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-78: Regulation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, art. 5 (2012) (Westlaw China
7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-95: Regulation
of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, ch. 2 (2013) (Westlaw China 7Jj$
(Westlaw China)).
45 See SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 14; NAT'L PEOPLE's CONG.,
PRC 2014-14: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 22
(2014) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)) [hereinafter SECURITIES LAw
2014]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-122: Regulation of Initial Public
Offering and Listing, art. 35 (2016) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China));
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2009-62: Charter of Offering Examination and
Verification Committee, art. 6 (2009) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China))
[hereinafter OFFERING E&V COMMITTEE CHARTER].
46 &e SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 13(2); CSRC 2015-122,
supra note 45, art. 30.
47 &e SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 10; SECURITIES LAW 2014,
supra note 45, art. 10; OFFERING E&V COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 45,
arts. 3, 29.
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of the National Development and Reform Commission, the provincial government of the issuer's principal place of business, and
"other relevant government departments," to "ensure compliance
with national industrial policies and other national policies."4B
At the end of 2013, China's Communist Party Central Committee announced China's plan of a grand offering reform to move
from the current Verification and Approval System to a disclosurebased Registration System, and to accomplish key reform targets
by 2020.49
As IPO pricing evolved from a government-determinants model
in 1993,50 to a government approval model in 1999,51 and to a government filing model since 2004, 52 mandatory earnings projections
as the basis for IPO pricing lost their raison d'etre. In 2001, the
CSRC gave issuers the option of disclosing in the IPO prospectus
either earnings projections or additional line items related to the
use of offering proceeds, offering price, and dividend policy.53 The
CSRC also introduced a line item in the prospectus mandating
"a brief discussion by management of ... any known or uncertain
factors that have caused or may cause serious difficulties to the
issuer''54_an MD&A idea that has, since 2006, developed into a
full-fledged, mandatory ''Management Discussion and Analysis"
section in IPO and following-on offering prospectuses and in issuer
CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, arts. 11, 33, 36--37.
See CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENT. COMM., RESOLUTIONS OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON CERTAIN CRITICAL ISSUES
RELATED TO ALL-AROUND AND DEEPENING REFORMS, § 3(12) (2013), http://www
.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2J2-F3UK]; Xi
Jinping, Explanatory Note to Resolutions, , 2(4) (2013), http://www.gov.cn/ldhd
/2013-11/15/content_2528186.htm [https://perma.cc/B243-NV6Z].
60 See supra notes 38--39 and accompanying text.
51 See SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 28; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.,
PRC 1999-29: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBIJC OF CHINA, art. 131(2)
(1999) (Westlaw China Jj"j$ (Westlaw China)) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW 1999].
52 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2004-21: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CH1NA, art. 28 (2004) (Westlaw China Jj"j$ (West1aw China))
[hereinafter SECURITIES LAW 2004]; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2004-20:
COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 131 (2004) (West1aw
China Jj"j$ (West1aw China)) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW 2004].
53 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-41: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 1-IPO Prospectus, §§ 12-13 (2001) (West1aw China Jj"j$
(Westlaw China)).
54 Id. § 10 art. 141.
48
49
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periodic reports. 55 In 2005, the Company Law was amended: the
mandatory earnings projection clause was eliminated and replaced
by the term ''Verification and Approval System" introduced by the
first Securities Law (1999). 56
The current bifurcated mandatory/voluntary policy on earnings
projections in connection with an IPO was adopted by the CSRC
in 2006, when it adopted the Regulation of Initial Public Offering
and Listing.57 An IPO issuer must make earnings projections if
55 For SHSE and SZSE's Main Board and SZSE's SME Board issuers, see
Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-5: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide
No. 1-IPO Prospectus, ch. 2 § 11 (2006) (Westlaw Clrina 7J1t (Westlaw Chlna));
Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-2: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide
No. 11-Public Offering Prospectus of Listed Issuer, ch. 2 § 7 (2006) http://www
.sse.com.cnllawandrules/regulations/disclosure/a/Disclo20060509a.pdf [https:/1
perma.cc/RX59-MRVK]; Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-24: Form and
Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 2--Annual Report, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3 (2015),
http://www.carc.gov.cnlpublzjhpublidG00306201/201406/t20140607_255636.htm
[https://perma.cdF3ZZ-Z4YR]; Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-22: Form
and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 3--Semi-Annual Report, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3
(2014), http://www.carc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublidG003062011201406/t20140607_2556
37.htm [https://perma.crJM6JQ-4G45].
For SZSE's ChiNext Market issuers, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC
2014-28: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 28--IPO Prospectus of
ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 9 (2014) http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpublzjhpublic/zjb/201406
/t20140613_256062.htm [https://perma.cc/67UE-M4ZW]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
CSRC 2014-30: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 35--Public Offering
Prospectus of ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 7 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjh
public/zjb/201406/t20 140613_256065.htm [https://perma.cc/8MGL-WZ3F]; China
Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-43: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide
No. 30---Annual Report ofChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3 (2013), http://www
.csrc. gov.cnlpub/newsite/flb/fl.fglbmgf/xxpl/xxplnr/20 1310/t20 131017_236416
.html [https://perma.cc/5KDA-ZX23]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 201329: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 31--Semi-Annual Report of
ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 3, ch. 3 § 3 (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite
/flb/flfglbmgf/xxpllxxplnr/201310/t201310 17_236417 .html [https://perma.cc
17MUM-2G6B]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-21: Form and Contents of
Disclosure Guide No. 20---Quarterly Reports of ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 3 (2013),
http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/flblflfglbmgflxxpl/xxplgz/201310/t20131021
_236589. html [https://perma.cc/F27J-PLPB].
55 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2005-42: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 135 (2006) (Westlaw China 7J1t (Westlaw China)).
57 See Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-32: Regulation of Initial Public
Offering and Listing art. 68 (2006), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/zjh
/200804/t20080418_14502.htm [https://perma.cc/D7FT-YDB4]; see also CSRC
2015-122, supra note 45, art. 56.
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the offering proceeds are applied to make any "Significant Asset
Purchase,"58 defined to mean a purchase by the issuer when (1) the
ratio of the gross asset value (or net asset value) of the asset to be
purchased to the gross assets (or net assets) of the issuer as reported in its consolidated financial statements of the most recent
year is at least 50 percent; or (2) the ratio of the business income
generated in the immediately preceding year by the asset to be
purchased to the business income of the issuer in the same period
is at least 50 percent. 59 An IPO issuer may make earnings projections if "it believes that such earnings projections are useful to
informed investment decisionmaking by investors, and it is confident of its forecasting ability ."so
Regardless of whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary,
an IPO issuer's earnings projections must be made in the form of
an Issuer Earnings Projection Report, consisting of:
•
•
•

a projected earnings table, which must be in the
same format as the issuer's income statement;
notes, disclosing key underlying assumptions and
forecasting methodology; and
a uniform cautionary legend, alerting investors to
"use projections with caution due to uncertainties
associated with assumptions."61

An Auditor's Report of Attestation of Management Earnings Projections must be appended to the Issuer Earnings Projection
Report.62 Both reports must be made exhibits to the IPO prospectus.63
Regardless of whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary
and subject to an undefined force majeure exoneration, in the
event of an over-projection by 20 percent or more determined ex
post, both the legal representative of the issuer and the attesting
auditor must make public apologies at the shareholder meeting
and in CSRC-designated media. The issuer representative may
CSRC 2006-5, supra note 55, art. 84.
&e CSRC 2006-2, supra note 55, art. 39.
oo &e CSRC 2006-5, supra note 55, art. 84.
"' Id. arts. 85--86.
62 Id. arts. 8, 124.
as Id. art. 128.
58
59
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additionally receive a CSRC warning. 64 If the over-projection
reaches 50 percent, the issuer shall be suspended from access to
the public offering market for a period of three years. 65 Earnings
projections in connection with follow-on offerings (public or private)
by listed issuers are governed by a mandatory/voluntary disclosure policy similar to that for an IPO issuer.66

B. Listed Issuer Significant Assets Restructuring and Earnings
Projection Disclosure
Historically, a typical Chinese state-owned enterprise esOE")
was composed of profitable business units, unprofitable business
units, and not-for-profit units. SOE-controlled listed issuers were
generally IPO carveouts of SOEs' profitable units, with the unprofitable and not-for-profit units being kept by the parent
SOEs. 67 Most of the central and local government-controlled
listed issuers adopt a form of pyramidal structure which does
not create a divergence between voting rights and cash flow
rights but which credibly transfers rights in respect of day-today operations to the SOE managers. 68 In comparison, private
CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, art. 56.
Id.
"" For Main Board and SME Board issuers, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
CSRC 2006-30: Regulation of Securities Offerings by Listed Issuers, arts. 2--3,
59, 67 (2006), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2006-05/07/content_27481l.htm [https:/1
perma.cc/8TA3-S2TD]; CSRC 2006-2, supra note 55, arts. 2, 37, 42--44, 70, 75;
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-303: Form and Contents of Disclosure
Guide No. 25---Private Placement Memorandum of Listed Issuer, arts. 1, 8
(2007) (Westlaw China JJlllt (Westlaw China)). For ChiNext Market issuers, see
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-123: Regulation oflnitisl Public Offering
and Listing on ChiNext Market, art. 55 (2016) (Westlaw China JJlllt (Westlaw
China)); CSRC 2014-28, supra note 55, arts. 7, 74, 96, 101(6); China Sec. Reg.
Comm'n, CSRC 2014-100: Provisions! Regulation of Offerings by ChiNext Issuers, arts. 2--3, 48, 58 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201
/201405/t20140529_255116.htm [https://perma.cc/8NWD-6B88]; CSRC 2014-30,
supra note 55, ch. 2 §§ 6, 10--11; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-31: Form
and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 36---Private Placement Memorandum of
ChiNext Issuer, arts. 4(3), 8 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpubliclzjh
/201406/t20140613_256066.htm [https://perma.cc/4CM9-F7YA].
67 See Joseph Abarony, Chi-wen J. Lee & T. J. Wong, Financial Packaging
of !PO Firms in China, 38 J. AcCT. REs. 103 (2000).
ss See, e.g., Joseph Fan, T. J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, Institutions and
Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids, 29
64
65
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entrepreneur-controlled Chinese listed issuers generally come from
one of three backgrounds: IPOs (close to 50 percent); reverse mergers, generally with poor performing listed issuers (close to 50 percent); and management buyouts or MBOs (a limited few). 69 The
Shanghai Stock Exchange runs a main board; the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange runs a main board, a Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprise esME") board, and a ChiNext Market for micro issuers. 7o
Less than 40 percent of the issuers on the two main boards, the
vast majority of the SME issuers, and nearly all of the ChiNext
issuers are private entrepreneur-controlled. 71 All of the private
entrepreneur-controlled issuers on the SHSE and SZSE's main
boards, some on the SME board, and few on the ChiNext Market
adopt pyramiding or cross-holdings ownership structures,72 which
enhance the ultimate controlling person's share of control (or
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1217, §§ 1, 3.2 (2013); ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG UNN.,
SHANGHAI SUN YAT-SEN UNN. ECON. INST. & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR
2009-20: STATE ASSETS MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL SOE-CONTROLLED LISTED ISSUERS 21-24, 45--47 (2009), http://www.sse
.com.cn/researchpublicationsljointresearchlrlplan20100311c.pdf [https://perma
.crJQU98-XW92].
69 See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH INST., SZRI 2008-0160: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEUR-CONTROLLED
LISTED ISSUERS IN CHINA 13, 23 (2008), http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2008/02
/25/091811911155.pdf [https://perma.cri664P-WTJ6]; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH.
RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNANCE STUDY OF THE CHINESE LISTED ISSUERS: PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEUR-CONTROLLED LISTED ISSUERS 7-8, 21-26 (2005), http://www.sse
.com.cn/researchpublicationslspeciallrlc_20120712_91l.shtml [https://perma.cc
/UZF5-26SX] [hereinafter SHSE, GOVERNANCE STUDY]. Management buyout
of a large SOE or a listed SOE is prohibited. See State-owned Assets Supervision and Adm. Comm'n (SASAC) & Ministry of Finance, SASAC 2005-78: Provisional Regulation of Management Buyouts in State-Owned Enterprises, art. 3
(2005) (Westlaw China 7J1'1! (Westlaw China)).
70 See Chengxi Yao, Market Structure of the Chinese Equity Markets, 19
FORDHAMJ. CORP. &FIN. L. 109, §§ B.1, C.1 (2014).
71 See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH INST., SZRI 2011-0079: A
COMPARISON OF SME BOARD AND CHINEXT MARKET-CURRENT STATUS AND
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 14-15 (2011); Shanghai Stock Exch. Capital Mkts.
Research lnst., ¥2012 Corporate Governance Survey Report of SHSE-Listed
Issuers, SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS, Oct. 23, 2013, at A08.
72 See SHSE, GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 69, ch. 4; Shenzhen Stock
Exch. Corp. Governance Ctr., ¥2012 Corporate Governance Statistical Report of
SZSE-Listed Issuers, SEC. DAILY, Aug. 12, 2013, at A12, http://epaper.stcn
.com/paper/zqsb/page/1/2013-08/12/A012/20130812A012_pdf.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VZB3-N6Y5].
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voting rights) given its share of ownership (or cash flow rights)
in the listed issuer. 73
Categorized based on the person ultimately controlling the
issuer, 74 the largest stockholders of the Chinese listed issuers
fall among the following six types: central SOE (or central
government-controlled SOE); local SOE (or local governmentcontrolled SOE); private entrepreneur; foreign investor; township,
university, etc.; and hybrid (where the largest stockholder is
controlled by two or more types of persons). 75 Based on issuers'
filings as of Q3 2014,76 Table 1 below provides summarized statistics of share concentrations of the largest stockholders of SHSE
and SZSE listed issuers; Table 2 provides a summary view of such
issuers' market capitalizations and industry sector distributions. 77

73 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan & Larry Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J.
FIN. 2741, 2742-43, 2758 (2002). Cf. supra text accompanying note 68.
74 For definitions of "controlling shareholder" and "the ultimate controlling
person of the issuer," see NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2013-8: COMPANY LAW OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CmNA, arts. 216(2)-(3) (2014) (Westlaw China 7Jj$:
(Westlaw China)).
75 Cf. China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-98: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 5--Statement of Changes in Issuer Shareholdings (Form 6:
Categories of Top Ten Shareholders) (2007), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub
/shenzhenlztzllssgsjgxx/jgfg/ssxxpl/201506/t20150612_279020.htm [https://per
ma.cc/738B-Q4DC].
76 Listed issuers are required to disclose their top ten shareholders' information in their annual reports, semi-annual reports, and quarterly reports. See, e.g.,
SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, arts. 66(4)-{5); SC 1993-112, supra note 36,
art. 59(5); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-40: Listed Issuer Disclosure
Regulation, arts. 21(3), 22(3) (2007), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/zjhxwfb
lxwdd/200702/t20070201_68467.html [https://perma.cc/49LD-U9S6]; CSRC 201524, supra note 55, arts. 46, 69; CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, arts. 35(2), 50;
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-23: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide
No. 13--Quartsrly Reports, art. 8 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic
/G00306201/201406/P020140607633786255126.doc [https://perma.cc/W4X6-NB8F];
CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, arts. 38, 48; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55, art. 10.
77 Issuer data, including ownership, market capitalization, and industry
sector, were retrieved from the WIND Financial Terminal and processed by the
Author. Full data are available from the Author. The WIND system is the premier financial database in China. See WIND INFO. Co., LTD., http://www.wind
.com.cn [https://perma.cc/LMP4-R3SX].
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Under the Company Law and the Securities Law from their
initial enactments to their present forms, Chinese regulatory policy uses the accounting yardsticks of "three consecutive years'
operating losses" to institute a stock trading suspension and delisting in the fourth consecutive loss year, and "three consecutive
years' operating profits" to grant listed issuers access to the public offering markets.7B As evidenced by empirical literature studying the Chinese markets,79 such accounting number-based policy
has motivated the use of asset exchanges with listed issuers for
strategic "propping," i.e., provision of financial support by the controlling shareholder to the listed firm today in order to preserve
its option to expropriate minority shareholders tomorrow (also referred to as "negative tunneling''). SO The policy has also motivated
the predatory practice of "tunneling," i.e., siphoning off resources
from the listed firm by the controlling shareholder through selfdealing real or financial transactions. BI
Asset exchanges with listed issuers are regulated under the
rubric of "Significant Assets Restructuring'' esAR'') by a listed

78 See, e.g., COMPANY LAW 1994, supra note 38, arts. 137, 152, 157-58;
SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 49; SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra
note 45, arts. 55-66; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-1: Regulation of
Follow-on and Rights Offerings by Listed Issuers, art. 8 (2001) (Westlaw
China 731$ (Westlaw China)); CSRC 2006-30, supra note 66, art. 7.
79 See, e.g., In-mu Haw, Daqing Qi, Donghui Wu & Woody Wu, Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in
China, 22 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 95 (2005); Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A
Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CoRP. FIN. 881 (2007); Guohua Jiang, Charles M.C.
Lee & Heng Yue, Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2010); Winnie Q. Peng, K.C. Wei & Zhishu Yang,
Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J.
CORP. FIN. 306 (2011).
so Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Propping and Tunneling,
31 J. COMP. ECON. 732, 734-35 (2003).
81 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 22, 22--23 (2000). An example of
tunneling via real transaction is where an asset is transferred from the firm
to the controlling shareholder at nonmarket prices. An example of tunneling
via financial transaction is where the controlling shareholder increases its
share of the firm through dilutive share issues. !d. at 26.
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issuer.B2 An SAR is defined to mean asset purchase(s), sale(s),
and/or other exchange(s) by a listed issuer (including firms controlled by such issuer) when, computed based on the issuer's audited consolidated financial statements of the most recent fiscal
year, such transactions meet any one of the following three benchmarks and cause significant changes to the main business, assets,
and income of the listed issuer:
(1) the ratio of the gross asset value of the assets purchased and sold by the issuer to the gross assets of
the issuer is at least 50 percent;Ba
(2) the ratio of the business income generated in the
most recent fiscal year by the assets purchased and
sold by the issuer to the business income of the issuer during the same period is at least 50 percent;84
or
(3) the ratio of the net asset value of the assets purchased and sold by the issuer to the net assets of
the issuer is at least 50 percent and such net asset
value exceeds CN¥50 million.s5
For the purpose of the SAR definition, "assets" include both "equity
assets" and "non-equity assets" (such as non-equity financial assets
and real, or physical, assets). sa
From the perspective of issuer earnings projections, the characteristics and regulation of SARs have evolved in three stages:
from the 1990s to the end of 2001 (no earnings projection requirement); from 2002 to November 2014 (across-the-board mandatory earnings projection requirement); and from November 2014
onward (across-the-board mandatory MD&A discussion requirement and related-party SAR mandatory earnings projection
requirement). As of the end of 2001, the combination of the IPO
82 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-109: Regulation of Significant
Assets Restructuring by Listed Issuers, art. 2 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn
/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/20 1410/P020 141024548321879951. pdf [https://perma.cc/3D
YL-S7JZ].
83 Id. art. 12(1).
B4 Id. art. 12(2).
85 Id. art. 12(3).
86 Id. art. 14.
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quotas and allowance system87 and accounting earnings-based
delisting and offering access systemBBled to SARs primarily to gain
listing (of the assets of an unlisted entity which became the controlling shareholder post-transaction, or the unlisted assets of the
existing controlling shareholder of the listed issuer) via reverse
merger; to avoid delisting; or to qualify for a follow-on offering.s9
The SAR activities during this period were regulated in a stop-go
approach, being perceived by the regulators ambivalently as a
means to avoid listing standards,90 or as a means to improve listed
issuers' assets quality.91 No earnings projections were required in
connection with listed issuer SAR activities.92
During the second stage beginning in 2002, in response to the
"related party transactions" ("RPTs"), 93 "controlling shareholderissuer business competition,"94 and "restructuring for accounting
See supra Part LA and accompanying notes.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
89 See, e.g., CHINA SEC. REG. CoMM'N & TX INVEST. CONSULT. Co., LTD., SHJR
2007-17: NEW APPROACHES TO M&A AND RESTRUCTURING OF LiSTED ISSUERS
§ 1.1 (2007), http:/lwww.sse.eom.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/dplan2007
1227h.pdf [https://perma.cc/94F7-B37W]; XIAO MA, HANDBOOK OF LiSTED COMPANY M&A AND RESTRUCTURING RULES AND REGULATIONS §§ 3.1, 4.6 (BEIJING:
LAW PRESS CHINA 2009).
oo See, e.g., China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1998-26: Certain Issues Related
to Assets Exchange and Change of Business by Listed Issuers (1998) (Westlaw
China 7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)).
91 See, e.g., China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-75: Standardizing Significant Asset Purchases and Sales by Listed Issuers (2000) (Westlaw China
7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)).
92 See supra notes 90-91.
93 "Related party transactions'' or RPTs are defined by the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) to mean transfers of resources, services, and/or obligations between related parties. "Related parties of a firm" include, inter alia, the firm's
parent, subsidiaries, and companies under the common control with the firm.
See Ministry of Finance, MOF 2006-3: Enterprise Accounting Principle No. 36:
Related Party Disclosure (2006) (Westlaw China 7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)). Not
all RPTs are adverse to the firm interest: RPTs may be means for the controlling shareholder (as well as other corporate insiders) to expropriate outside
shareholders; RPTs may also be a means of efficient contracting. See Michael
Ryngaert & Shawn Thomas, Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are
the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 845 (2012). In this
Article, RPTs generally refer to the expropriation type. See supra note 79.
94 "Controlling shareholder-issuer business competition" refers to the
phenomenon where the controlling shareholder (or its subsidiaries other than
87

BB
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cosmetics" or sham restructuring prevalent among SARs,95 the
CSRC issued an administrative notice mandating earnings projections by all listed issuers effecting SARs.96 The notice contemplated public enforcement for over-projections.97 The penalties for
ex post over-projections made in connection with an SAR paralleled those in connection with stock offerings. as
The year 2008 saw CSRC's first official rulemaking regulating
listed issuers' SAR activities: the Regulation of Significant Assets
Restructuring by Listed Issuers. The regulation set forth an earnings projection policy combining public enforcement with private
compensation, and designed to prevent overpricing of assets sold
to listed issuers and underpricing of listed issuers' stocks issued
to fund the SARs. The policy contained three main components:
•
•

•

a mandatory earnings projection requirement;
mandatory disclosure of realization-projection comparison, and a mandatory private compensation
scheme; and
public enforcement against ex post inaccurate-and
regulatory reward for ex post accurate--projections. 99

First, the listed issuer must make earnings projections with respect to the assets to be purchased, and to its own firm if it issued
stock to fund the SAR or if the SAR reached scales requiring approval by the Listed Issuer M&A and Restructuring Examination
the listed subsidiary) engage(s) in the same or similar lines of business as, and
act(s) in competition with, the listed issuer. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n &
State Econ. & Trade Comm'n, CSRC 2002-1: Governance Principles of Listed
Issuers, art. 27 (2002) (Westlaw China 7Jf'l! (Westlaw China)).
95 See supra note 89; see also SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH. INST.,
SZRI 2010-0064: ASSETS RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES OF SME ISSUERS DURING
THE 2004--2008 PERIOD: CHARACTERISTICS, ISSUES, AND POIJCY RECOMMENDATIONS 36--37 (2010).
96 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-105: Certain Issues Related to
Significant Asset Purchases, Sales, and Exchanges by Listed Issuers, app. art.
5(1) (2002) (Westlaw China 7Jf'l! (Westlaw China)).
97 !d. art. 15.
ss Id. See also CSRC 2001-1, supra note 78, art. 32; see supra text accompanying notes 64--66.
99 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2008-53: Regulation of Significant Assets
Restructuring by Listed Issuers (2008) (Westlaw China 7Jf'l! (Westlaw China))
[hereinafter SAR Regulation 2008].
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and Verification Committee ('SAR E&V Committee"). lOU All earnings projections must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.lol
If the issuer was unable to make the required projections, it must
show the reason thereof, release a Special Risk Factor Statement,
and provide an MD&A discussion in the SAR Report in lieu of
earnings projections.1o2
Second, in its annual reports for three years following an SAR,
the issuer must provide computations of any disparities between
projected earnings and realized earnings, pertaining to the purchased assets and to its own firm separately. loa All such computations must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.l04 For the
SAR completion year and the following year, the independent financial advisor retained by the issuer for the SAR transaction
must publish a Post-SAR Continuous Supervision and Guidance
Annual Opinion comparing projected earnings with realized earnings, and comparing the issuer's MD&A discussion in the SAR
Report with its actual results of operations. 105 To the extent that
realized earnings fell short of the projected earnings pertaining to
the purchased assets, the SAR counterpart must compensate the
listed issuer_106
Third, in the case of an over-projection by 20 percent or more,
or if actual results of operations were substantially inferior to the
MD &A discussion, the chairman and the general manager of the
issuer, as well as the intermediaries participating in the SAR
(such as the accounting firm, the independent financial advisor
and the assets appraisal firm, and their staff involved in the SAR
100 Id. art. 17, 27. The SAR E&V Committee was established by the CSRC in
2004. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2004-41: Charter of Listed Issuer
Restructuring Examination and Verification Committee (2004) (Westlaw China
)Jj$ (Westlaw China)). For its current functions, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
CSRC 2014-15: Charter of Listed Issuer M&A and Restructuring Examination
and Verification Committee (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/GOO
306201/20 1405/t20 140509_24874l.htm. [https://perma.cc/V7RR-CDVD].
101 CSRC 2008-53, supra note 99, art. 17.
102 Id.
10s Id. art. 33.
104 Id.
10s Id. art. 15, 36.
100 Id. art. 33.
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transaction) must all make apologies to investors in the CSRCdesignated media_107 If the over-projection reached 50 percent,
all the preceding parties could additionally be subject to CSRC's
"regulatory measures." lOB Actual meting out of the penalties was
subject to an undefined force majeure exception_109 On the other
hand, if the realized earnings post-SAR pertaining to the issuer
and the purchased assets met their respective projected earnings,
the CSRC would allow the issuer to use pro formauo accounting
earnings for the issuer's pre-SAR period in qualifying for a postSAR public offering.m
Id. art. 54.
Id.
109 Id. art. 8, 54. A sample study of twenty-seven group companies listed
101

108

via merging the unlisted parent with the listed subsidiary as of June 2009
found that fifteen out of the twenty-seven listed group companies did
not meet their earnings projections made in connection with the SARs. See
Fu!>AN UNN. & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR 2009-20: GROUP COMPANY
LISTINGS AND ISSUER PERFORMANCES§§ 2.4, 6.1 (2009), http://www.sse.com.cn
/researchpublications/jointresearchlc/plan20 100311a. pdf [https://perma.cc
N9CL-6LRF].
no Neither the CSRC, nor the Chinese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (CICPA), nor the latter's regulator the Ministry of Finance has
adopted any rule or standard governing pro forma financial information. Cf.
Pro Forma Financial Information, 17 C.F.R. § 210.11 (2016); AICPA, REPORTING ON PRO FORMA FINANCIAL INFORMATION, SSAE No. 10 (2001), http://www
.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AT-004
Ol.pdf [https://perma.cc/F63D-6U6Q]. "Pro forma financial information" in Regulation S-X is to be distinguished from "non-GAAP financial measures" targeted by Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The former is intended to
depict the continuing impact of an actual or proposed transaction on the historical GAAP financial statements, and shows the specific adjustments that
would have been required by GAAP had the transaction occurred at an earlier time, and ending with the pro forma statements. The latter refers to financial information calculated and presented on the basis of methodologies
other than in accordance with GAAP, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act sought to
eliminate manipulative or misleading use of non-GAAP financial measures.
See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Financial Reporting
Release No. 65, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820, 4820-21 n.12 (2003); Conditions for Use of
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8145, Exchange
Act Release No. 46,788, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,790, 68,791 n.12 (2002).
m CSRC 2008-53, supra note 99, art. 47. See also supra text accompanying
note 78. The CSRC's 2011 and 2013 amendments to the SAR Regulation have retained the 2008 earnings projection policy, except that where an SAR results
in a "back-door listing," the independent financial advisor must publish its
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The third stage is preceded by China's Twelfth Five-Year
(2011-2015) Plan for National Economic and Social Developments,
which envisions group listings of large SOEs, 112 as opposed to
IPO carveout listings.J 13 This stage of SAR characteristics and
regulation is guided by the State Council's emphasis on SARs as
important means of resource allocation by the capital markets,
and on the increased role of the market in SAR regulation.114 In
2014, the CSRC reoriented its SAR regulation. It set the primacy
of issuer MD&A discussion over issuer earnings projections,
noting "the inherent unreliability of earnings projections." liS It
Post-BAR Annual Opinion for three years. The 2011 amendment defines a
"back-door listing'' as an BAR in which the ratio of the gross asset value of
the assets purchased by the listed issuer to the gross assets of the issuer as
reported in its audited consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year
immediately preceding the change in control of the listed issuer is at least
100 percent. The 2013 amendment subjects back-door listing candidates to
the same financial standards applicable to IPO candidates "to prevent regulatory arbitrage between IPO regulation and back-door listing regulation, and
to prevent avoidance of the delisting system." See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
CSRC 2011-73: Regulation of Significant Assets Restructuring by Listed
Issuers, arts. 12, 36--37 (2011), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz
/ssl/201310/t20131016_23631l.html [https://perma.cc/8QTP-R6PA]; China Sec.
Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-61: Notice of Equal Examination and Verification
Standards Applicable to IPO Listing and Back-Door Listing Applicants (2013),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfglbmgf/ssgslbgcz/201402/t20140218
_243967 .html [https://perma.cc/Q73C-WJAF].
112 See STATE COUNCIL, TwELFrH FIVE-YEAR (20 11-2015) PLAN FOR NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND SoCIALDEVEWPMENTS § 45.1 (2011), http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11
2934 72/n 11293832/n13095885/13617181.html [https://perma.cc/8L29-NUSG];
see also NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., NPC 2011-X: RESOLUTION APPROVING STATE
COUNCIL'S TwELFTH FIVE-YEAR (2011-2015) PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DEVEWPMENTS (2011) (Westlaw China 711$ (Westlaw China));
Chinese Communist Party Cent. Comm., CCPCC 2010-X: Recommendation
for the Formulation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Developments (2010) (Westlaw China 711$ (Westlaw China)).
113 See supra text accompanying note 67.
114 See State Council, SC 2014-14: Opinion on Further Improving Regulatory
Environment for Corporate Restructuring, '1['1[1.2, 3.6 (2014), http://www.gov.cn
/zhengce/content/2014-03/24/content_8721.htm [https://perma.cc/8TTQ-L5QW];
State Council, SC 2014-17: On Further Facilitating Healthy Development of
the Capital Markets, '1['1[1.1-1.2, 2.7 (2014) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content
/2014-05/09/content_8798.htm [https://perma.cc/97SD-EYKC].
116 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-109p: Explanatory Notes to
Proposed Amendment of Regulation of Significant Assets Restructuring by
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differentiated between an issuer SAR with its controlling shareholder and an arm's-length SAR, noting "the inherent market
forces in play" in the latter.1 16 Compared with the SAR Regulation (2008),117 the current SAR Regulation (2014) has these
three features:
•
•
•

mandatory MD&A discussion for all SARs, and
voluntary earnings projections permitted;
mandatory projection disclosure and mandatory
compensation scheme for related-party SARs; and
public enforcement against ex post inaccurateand regulatory reward for ex post accurateprojections.UB

First, a listed issuer effecting an SAR must provide an MD&A
in the SAR Report, discussing the impact of the SAR on its continued operating ability, its future prospects, its earnings per
share in the SAR year, and other financial and non-financial
benchmarks.1 19 The issuer may make earnings projections which,
if made, must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.12o
Second, if an issuer effects an SAR with its controlling
shareholder (or a related party of the latter) or with a party who
becomes the controlling shareholder post-SAR, and the SAR pricing is based on earnings projections, then for three years post-SAR
the issuer must disclose an annual computation of any disparities
between projected earnings and realized earnings pertaining to
the assets purchased.1 21 Such computation must be attested by a
qualified accounting firm and published in the issuer's annual
report. 122 To the extent that realized earnings fall short of
the projected earnings, the related-party SAR counterpart must
Listed Issuers, § 2.5 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/G00306201
/20 1407/P020 14071153456531966l.doc [https://perma.cc/4PU4-DSUS].
11a Id. § 2.6.
117 See supra text accompanying note 99.
118 See CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82.
119 Id. art. 19.
120 Id. art. 22.
121 Id. art. 35.
122

Id.
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compensate the listed issuer. 123 To the extent that the SAR
transaction dilutes the earnings per share of the issuer in the
SAR year, the SAR counterpart must undertake to make the
issuer whole_l24
In contrast, if the issuer effects an SAR with a non-related
party and the SAR does not result in a change in control of the
issuer, the ex post comparison and compensation requirements
do not apply. The exemption is based on the rationale that the
negotiation process of a non-related party SAR is subject to
market forces, and that the assets purchased by the listed issuer
in the SAR have since been operated by it and are no longer
under the control of the non-related SAR counterpart.1 25
Regardless of related party or non-related party SAR, the independent financial advisor to the listed issuer SAR transaction
must, fur four years in the case of an SAR resulting in a ''back-door
listing''126 and two years otherwise, publish a Post-SAR Continuous Supervision and Guidance Annual Opinion, comparing projected earnings with realized earnings, and the issuer's MD&A
discussion with actual results of operations.127
Third, the SAR Regulation (2014) has left intact the SAR
Regulation (2008)'s carrot and stick policies for accurate projections and over-projections.12s

C. Issuer Periodic and Current Reporting and Earnings
(Forecast) Disclosure
Listed issuers began to be subject to annual, semi-annual, and
current reporting requirements in 1993.129In 2001, motivated by
Id.
Id.
126 Id. See also CSRC Q&A's with Press Regarding SAR Regulation Amendment, Q&A No. 6, CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N (July 11, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov
12a

12•

.cnlpub/newsiteh;jhxwfblxwdd/201407/t2014071L257663.html [https://perma.cc
/M475-JCV4].
12• For the definition of an BAR resulting in a "back-door listing," see supra
note 111.
127 CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82, art. 38.
128 Id. arts. 51, 59. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
129 See State Council, SC 1993-112, supra note 36, art. 57; China Sec. Reg.
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the need for enhanced market transparency with respect to issuers
facing delisting risks, the CSRC added a quarterly reporting requirement across the board for all listed issuers.J30 To complement
the periodic and current reporting system for historical information, the CSRC and the stock exchanges set a bifurcated
mandatory/voluntary disclosure regime for earnings forecasts,
which evolved from annual earnings projections in 1994131 to semiannual and quarterly earnings forecasts beginning in 2002.132
The current mandatory/voluntary bifurcated periodic earnings
forecast system is administered by the CSRC and the stock exchanges according to their respective jurisdictions, and regulates
the following three types of information:
•
•
•

annual earnings projections: voluntary disclosure
subject to a duty to update;
periodic earnings projections: mandatory for exchange-designated issuers; and
earnings preannouncements: voluntary, generally.

Comm'n, CSRC 1993-43: Listed Company Disclosure Rules (Provisional), art. 4
(1993) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)).
"" See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-63: Notice Concenring Enhanced
Disclosure Requirement for ST and PI' Issuers (2000) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!:
(Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-55: Form and Contents
of Disclosure Guide No. 13--Quarterly Reports (2001) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!:
(Westlaw China)).
131 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1994-7: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 2---Annual Report (Provisional), § 2.5 (1994) (Westlaw
China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)) (annual earnings projections voluntary); cf.
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1998-148: Notice Concerning 1998 Annual
Report, art. 2 (1998) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)) (annual earnings
projections mandatory for loss issuers).
'"2 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2002-44: Form and Contents of
Disclosure Guide No. 3---Semi-Annual Report, art. 35 (2002) (Westlaw China
7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2002-X: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 13--Quarterly Reports, art. 12 (2002) (Westlaw
China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)); see also SHANGHAI STOCKEXCH., SHSE 2004-X:
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6.4 (2004) (Westlaw
China 7J jll!: (Westlaw China)); SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2004-107:
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LiSTING RULES, arts. 6.4--6.5 (2004) http://
www.szse.cn/UpFiles/Attach/1412/2004/12/0311611010156.doc [https://perma.cc
/GPF8-VEKR].

492 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459

In connection with the filing of its annual report, an issuer
may make annual earnings projections for the forthcoming year,
and disclose them in the current year's annual report. If an issuer
chooses to do so, it must have its earnings projections attested
by a qualified public accounting firm.taa The issuer becomes under
a duty to "timely'' (undefined by rule) disclose any "material update" (undefined by rule) to its earlier earnings projections, by
filing a current report with the listing stock exchange.134 The
issuer triggers a further duty to analyze any "material disparity''
(defined by rule to mean a threshold 20 percent ex post forecast
error in either direction) between its projected earnings and
realized earnings, and to disclose such material disparity and its
analysis in the following year's annual report.135
In connection with the filing of a periodic report, an issuer
must136 disclose its projected cumulative earnings from the beginning of the year through the end of the next reporting period
("Projection Period") 137 if it hits any of the following three
benchmarks ("Benchmark Issuer''):
133 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-212: Form and Contents of
Disclosure Guide No. 2--Annual Report, art. 33(2) (2007) (Westlaw China 7J:f$
(Westlaw China)).
134 See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2014-65: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 11.3. 7 (2014), http://www.sse.eom.cn/lawandrules
/sserulesllisting/stockla/20141019/0c66952a92b51b909f3d7516f52f9778.doc
[https://perma.cc/LW77-5CDJ]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2014-378:
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 11.3.8 (2014), http://
www.szse.cn/mainlfiles/2014/11/281%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E8%AF%81
%E5%88%B8%E4%BA%A4%E6%98%93%E6%89%80%E8%82%A1%E7%A5
%A8%E4%B8%8A%E5%B8%82%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99%EF%BC%882014
%5%B9%B4%E4%BF%AE%E8%AE%A2%EF%BC%89.pdf [https://perma.cc
IHS6A-QW6N]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2014-378-C: SHENZHEN STOCK
EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES FOR CHINEXT MARKET, art. 11.3.9 (2014),
http://www.szse.cn/mainlfiles/2014/12/25/%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E8%AF
%81%E5%88%B8%E4%BA%A4%E6%98%93%E6%89%80%E5%88%9B%E4
%B8%9A%E6%9D%BF%E8%82%A1%E7%A5%A8%E4%B8%8A%E5%B8%82
%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99%EF%BC%882014%E5%B9%B4%E4%BF%AE%E8
%AE%A2%EF%BC%89.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEM9-2XHV].
136 See CSRC 2015-24, supra note 55, arts. 28(3), 30.
136 Different treatments between the SHSE and the SZSE are discussed in
Part II.A, infra.
137 Where the periodic report is the annual report, the Projection Period shall
be the first quarter of the year following the year covered by the annual report.
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(1) the issuer projects an earnings loss for the projec-

tion period;
(2) the issuer projects an earnings turnaround from the
year-to-date loss reported in the periodic report, or
from the earnings loss reported for the same period
the previous year; or
(3) the issuer's projected earnings represent a threshold
50 percent increase or decrease compared to the
earnings reported for the same period the previous year.13B
The mandatory forecast must be concurrently disclosed in the
periodic report filed with the CSRC and repeated in a current
report filed with the issuer's stock listing exchange_139
Ex ante, issuers must assure and expressly represent that their
earnings forecasts are "accurate" and "objective," or caution to
the contrary.I 40 Issuers shall have a duty to "timely'' disclose any
"substantial update" to their previous forecast, and offer a public
apology for the revision.141 An issuer predicting a third-year
See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2010-X: FORMS AND CONTENTS OF DISCWSURE GUIDE No. 22--EARNINGS ESTIMATES AND PRELIMINARY EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND REVISIONS THEREOF (2014); cf. SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH.,
SHSE 2013-X: FORMS AND CONTENTS OF DISCWSURE GUIDE No. 1-CURRENT
REPORTS, ITEMS Nos. 27-30 (2013) (imposing no forecasting requirement in
connection with the annual report filing), http://www.sse.com.cnllawandrules
/guide/disclosure/dailymemo/dc_20130726_3728716.shtml [https://perma.cc/DZ

7V-ELK8].
138 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76,
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55,
art. 17. The SHSE only requires the Benchmark Issuers to make annual earnings projections, whereas the SZSE requires the Benchmark Issuers to make
quarterly, as well as annual, earnings projections. C<Jmpare SHSE 2014-65,
supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, with SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1,
and SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1.
1so

Id.

SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2, 2.6; SZSE 2014-378, supra
note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2, 2.5; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2,
2.4. A sample review of issuer earnings forecast releases for FY 2013 shows
that issuers generally provided the standard affirmative representations.
141 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 13.3.3; SZSE 2014-378, supra
note 134, arts. 11.3.3--11.3.5; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 11.3.411.3.6. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges' rules appear to fail to
140
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earnings loss after having suffered two consecutive years' losses
must repeat its negative predictions together with a "Trading
Suspension Risk Warning'' at least three times before its thirdyear annual report filing date. An issuer predicting a fourth-year
earnings loss after having suffered three consecutive years' losses
must disclose its negative predictions together with a "Stock Delisting Risk Warning'' prior to the tenth day after the end of the
fourth year.I42 Loss issuers on SZSE's ChiNext Market are required to disclose their earnings forecasts and suspension and
delisting risk warnings much earlier and with greater frequency
than their main board and SME board counterparts.I43
Different from the mandatory forecasting regime for Benchmark Issuers, any issuer may release a preliminary earnings announcement after the end of a reporting period but before the
filing of the periodic report. Such an earnings preannouncement
must include at a minimum all of the following nine items
for both the reporting period and the same period the year before, presented in a comparative format: (1) business income;
(2) business profits; (3) gross profits; (4) net profits; (5) gross assets;
(6) net assets; (7) earnings per share; (8) net assets per share;
and (9) return on equity.I44 The voluntary discloser must assure
that there is no material disparity between its preliminary earnings announcement and the final periodic report. In the event of
a threshold 20 percent disparity in either direction, the issuer
must issue a public apology simultaneously with its filing of the
periodic report.J 45
The idea for a preliminary earnings announcement originated
in 2000, when the stock exchanges informally required issuers to
release an advance, unaudited version of their annual financial
statements if the information had been leaked pending the filing
distinguish between a "correction'' and an "update." See Stransky v. Cummins
Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331--32 (7th Cir. 1995).
142 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, arts. 14.1.2, 14.3.2; SZSE 2014-378,
supra note 134, arts. 14.1.8, 14.4.4.
143 SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 13.1.2, 13.4.2.
144 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.5; SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134,
art. 11.3.6; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3. 7.
146 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.6; SZSE 2014-378, supra
note 134, art. 11.3. 7; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.8.
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of the audited annual report.1 46 In 2004, the stock exchanges'
listing rules imposed such a leak-triggered disclosure obligation
in connection with all periodic reports.t47 Since 2006, the stock exchanges started using the term "preliminary earnings announcement" (kuai bao) as a mandatory mechanism where the financial
information has been leaked, and voluntary otherwise.t4B
Tables 3 through 5 below provide a summary view of the timing,
reliability, and complementarity of issuer earnings forecasts
made under the mandatory regime and issuer earnings preannouncements made under the voluntary regime for FY 2013
earnings. The list of 2,489 issuers included in the analysis represents all issuers listed on the SHSE and SZSE at the end of Q4
2013, based on the CSRC published data esample Issuers").t49
Financial data are based on issuer filings retrieved from the WIND
Financial Terminal and processed by the Author. 150 "Reliability"
146 See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2000-Y: NOTICE REGARDING YEAR
2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (Westlaw China li ~ (Westlaw China));
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2000-Y: NOTICE REGARDING YEAR 2000
ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (Westlaw China li~ (Westlaw China)).
147 SHSE 2004-X, supra note 132, art. 6. 7; SZSE 2004-107, supra note 132,
art. 6.8.
148 SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2006-X: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6. 7, § 11.3 (2006) (Westlaw China lJ~ (Westlaw
China)); SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2006-X: SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6. 7, § 11.3 (2006) (Westlaw China lJ~ (Westlaw
China)). See also SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 6.7, § 11.3; SZSE 2014-378,
supra note 134, art. 6.9, § 11.3.
149 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Listed Issuers Categorized by Industry Codes
(Q4 2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/scb/ssgshyfljg/201401/W02014
0102326518754522.pdf [https://perma.cc/M76M-KWK8].
""Mandatory annual earnings forecasts for FY 2013 are based on Sample
Issuers' Q3 2013 periodic reports and current reports filed in or after October
2013. Some of the sample forecasts may not strictly have triggered the Benchmarks (see supra note 138 and accompanying text), but were nevertheless issued
under the mandatory regime. Only quantitative (i.e., point, range, and a few
open-ended) forecasts were included in the analysis; qualitative forecasts
were excluded. See Yongtae Kim, Michael Lacina & Myung Seok Park, Positive and Negative Information Transfers from Management Forecasts, 46 J.
ACCT. RES. 885, 889 n.3, 892 (2008). Voluntary annual earnings preannouncements are those filed by Sample Issuers preceding their audited 2013 annual
reports. Actual, reported 2013 annual earnings are from Sample Issuers' audited 2013 annual reports. Full data are available from the Author.
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Table 4
VOLU~TARY ANNUAL EARNINGS PREANNOU~CEMENTS BY SHSE Al\D SZSE LISTED ISSUERS FOR FY 2013
BASED ON ISSUER PREANNOU~CE:V!E~S RELEASED PRIOR TO THEIR AUDITED 2013 ANNUAL REPORT FI LI~GS
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0.0801 %
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Total
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*PA: Preannouncement. *PE: Preannouncement Error
NOTES:
1. Total number of issuers: 2,489. Number of issuers disclosing voluntary preannounce ments: 1,202.
2. Total number ofpreannouncements: 1,249.
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RECOMMENDED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
REPORTING AND PROJECTIONS

A. Constructing an Integrated Issuer Historical and ForwardLooking Disclosure System
Fragmented, incoherent, and sometimes contradictory regulatory rubrics currently govern issuer periodic and current reports
(including mandatory earnings projections and voluntary earnings
preannouncements), while the Listed Issuer Disclosure Regulation adopted by the CSRC in 2007 provides principles governing
listed issuers' offering and listing documentation, and periodic and
current reporting.I53 "Annual reports'' and "semi-annual reports"
have been mandated since 1993 by the State Council's Provisional
Regulation of Securities Offerings and Trading, and since 1999 by
the Securities Law. Their forms and contents have been standardized since 1994 by the CSRC Disclosure Guide for Annual
Report and CSRC Disclosure Guide for Semi-Annual Report.I54
"Quarterly reports" have been required since 2001 by the CSRC
Disclosure Guide for Quarterly Reports, but they are neither contemplated by the State Council's Provisional Regulation nor mandated by the Securities Law.I 55 The concept of "current reports"
originated in the 1993 State Council's Provisional Regulation.
The term "current reports" first appeared in 1998 in the stock
exchanges' listing rules, and since 1999 has also appeared in the
Securities Law.I 56 The list of "material events" within the scope
of current reports has been set in the Securities Law since 1999
CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, art. 5.
SC 1993·112, supra note 36, ch. 6; SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42,
§ 3.3; CSRC 1994·7, supra note 131; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CRSC 1994·87:
Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 3--Semi-Annual Report (Provisional)
(1994) (Westlaw China 711'1!: (Westlaw China)).
155 CSRC 2001·55, supra note 130; c{. SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45,
§ 3.3; SC 1993·112, supra note 36, ch. 6.
156 See, e.g., SC 1993·112, supra note 36, art. 60; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH.,
CSRC 1997·22: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LiSTING RULES, ch. 7 (1998)
(Westlaw China 711'1!: (Westlaw China)); SHENZHEN STOCKEXCH., CSRC 1997·23:
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES, ch. 7 (1998) (Westlaw China
711'1!: (Westlaw China)); SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 62.
153
154
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with little change over the years.t57 The forms and contents of
current reports are specified by each of the stock exchanges according to their respective standards, !58 and there is no CSRC
disclosure guide for current reports_159
Issuer earnings projections are governed, separately, by the
CSRC's disclosure guides for periodic reports, and by the stock
exchanges' listing rules and disclosure guides for current reports.
Under the rubric of periodic reporting regulation, the CSRC
mandates that Benchmark Issuers project their earnings ex ante
for the projection period_l60 Conversely, under the rubric of current
reporting regulation, the stock exchanges allow Benchmark Issuers to "project" earnings ex post, i.e., after the end of the relevant
accounting period.t61 The CSRC requires that earnings forecasts
by Benchmark Issuers be made progressively for six-month,
three-quarter, and one-year forecasting periods, to which the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange rules adhere. In contrast, the Shanghai
Stock Exchange rules cut down the three mandatory progressive
forecasting periods to a one-year forecasting period, and leave
the semi-annual and quarterly earnings forecasts to the discretion
of the Benchmark Issuers.162 Under both stock exchanges' rules,
157 See, e.g., SECURITIES LAw 1999, supra note 42, art. 62 (listing eleven
"material events"); SECURITIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, art. 67 (adding one
more "material event" to the 1999 list); cf CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, art. 30
(exercising authority delegated by the Securities Law and expanding the list
into twenty-one "material events").
1'" Compare SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, chs. 7-11, and SHSE 2013-X,
supra note 137, with SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, chs. 7-11, and SZSE
2010-X, supra note 137.
159 See CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, ch. 4; cf id. ch. 3, art. 29.
160 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76,
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55,
art. 17.
161 See SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1; SZSE 2010-X, supra
note 137, art. 2.
162 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76,
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55,
art. 17. Compare SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, and SZSE 2014378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, with SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art.
11.3.1. This Article does not engage in the current debate in the United States
concerning the advisability of management quarterly earnings guidance. Compare Leo E. Strine, Jr., 'lbward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational
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Benchmark Issuers, whose risk of negative earnings or earnings
volatility underlies the mandatory disclosure regime, need only
disclose "earnings," whereas non-Benchmark Issuers must disclose,
once they voluntarily undertake to preannounce, a whole range
of balance sheet and income statement items.tsa
This Article recommends an integrated issuer disclosure and
reporting system for Chinese issuers under the Securities Law,t64
by expanding and reconstructing the CSRC's Listed Issuer Disclosure Regulation into a central disclosure repository and operational mechanism and benefiting from the philosophy of SEC
Regulation S-K.165 Whereas Regulation S-K streamlined the two
distinct disclosure systems (under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act respectively) to achieve disclosure efficiency, this
Article recommends streamlining the two bifurcated jurisdictions
(over periodic reports by the CSRC and over current reports by the
stock exchanges respectively) to achieve efficient and equitable
regulation. 166 Specifically, all periodic and current reports should
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, § II.A.7 (2008) (advocating
prohibition of management quarterly earnings estimates, claiming that such
estimates provide little value to investors but manage to the market), with
Joel F. Houston, Baruch Lev & Jennifer Tucker, To Guide or Not to Guide?
Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance, 27
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 143, 178-79 (20 10) (documenting poor operating performance as a major motive for, and a deterioration in the information environment as a consequence of, quarterly guidance cessation), and Shuping Chen,
Dawn Matsumoto & Shiva Rajgopal, Is Silence Golden? An Empirical Analysis
of Firms That Stop Giving Quarterly Earnings Guidance, 51 J. ACCT. & EcoN.
134, 139 (2011) (documenting a similar finding). Instead, this Article discusses
the unequal mandatory forecasting periods imposed on issuers by China's two
stock exchanges respectively.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 136--38, 144.
164 In contrast to the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which govern primary markets and secondary markets respectively,
the Chinese Securities Law governs both primary and secondary markets in a
single statute. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1340, 1340-42 (1966); Yao, supra note 70, at 191.
165 Regulation S-K is the repository for filing instructions for non-financial
disclosures made under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See generally 17 C.F.R. 229 (2016); Adoption oflntegrated Disclosure System, Securities
Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 4 7 Fed. Reg. 11,380
(Mar. 16, 1982).
166 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 139, 161-62.
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be authorized by the Securities Law of the People's Republic of
China, with rulemaking authority related thereto granted to the
CSRC.167 The CSRC should prescribe uniform forms and line
items for all periodic and current reports. 168 Such a CSRCadministered mandatory disclosure system should facilitate a level
playing field-with respect to mandatory projections 169 -for
issuers listed on the SZSE, which features private entrepreneurcontrolled issuers, and issuers listed on the SHSE, which features state-controlled issuers.170
It further recommends integrating issuer earnings projections
into such a CSRC-administered public disclosure system. Three
disclosure policies should be addressed. First, "projection" (and
similar terms) should be rigorously defined. Academic literature,
as well as the accounting profession and securities regulators in
the United States,171 does not treat as "projections" management's
earnings disclosure issued after the end of the fiscal period and
before the filing of a formal periodic report. A bright line must be
drawn between the mandatory "earnings forecast" by a Benchmark Issuer (yu gao), 172 and the voluntary "earnings preannouncement" by any issuer (kuai bao).l73 An earnings "forecast" is a
167 Cf. 15 U.S. C. §§ 78m(a)-(b)(1) (2012) (requiring listed issuers to file
periodic and other reports with the Commission, and authorizing the Commission to prescribe forms and line items for such reports).
168 Cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 13a-ll, 13a-13 (2016) (requiring the filing of
annual reports, current reports, and quarterly reports); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308,
308a, 310 (2016) (requiring the use of Form 8-K, Form 10-Q, and Form 10-K for
filing current reports, quarterly reports, and annual reports); SEC, EXCHANGE
Acr FORMS, http:l/www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfinlformslexchange.shtml [https:l/
perma.ccfl'3PJ-5WUK] (setting forth filing instructions and line items for the
forms to be filed under the Exchange Act).
169 Disclosures by one firm can generate externalities to other firms. See
Ronald A Dye, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Discwsures: 'I'M Cases of Financial
and Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. REV. 1, 19--20 (1990).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 71, 162.
171 See, e.g., Rowland K Atiase, Haidan Li, Somchai Supattarakul & Senyo
Tse, Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals: Earnings
Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance, 10 REv. Accr. STUD. 497, 522
n.12 (2005); AI CPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4,
§ 301.08; Future Economic Performance Projections, Securities Act Release
No. 5581, Exchange Act Release No. 11,374, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,316, 20,317, 20,323
(May 9, 1975).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 136--39.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
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prediction of "future" earnings, and thus must have a "forecast
horizon" or the number of calendar days between the forecasting
date and the end of the forecast period. A "forecast period" in turn
refers to the time period covered by a forecast and may be partially expired by the forecasting date.I74 An earnings "preannouncement" is an early announcement of "historical" earnings,
i.e., a tentative report made after the end of an accounting period but shortly before the release of the formal report.J75
Second, a fair and transparent presentation format should be
prescribed for mandatory earnings projections. In particular, any
government subsidy should be separately disclosed, both in forecasted and reported earnings.I 76 Economic models and empirical
literature demonstrate that investors rely on management earnings forecasts and reported earnings to draw inferences about the
level and riskiness of the firm value; managers thus have incentives to manage reported earnings upward toward their forecasts
so as to influence investors' perceptions and to avoid reputation
loss or legal exposure due to missing their own forecasts.I 77 Empirical literature studying the Chinese markets has found that
174 See, e.g., Atiase et al., supra note 171, at 522 n.12; Grace Pownall,
Charles Wasley & Gregory Waynrire, The Stock Price Effects of Alternative
Types of Management Earnings Forecasts, 68 ACCT. REV. 896, 899 (1993);
AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, § 301.08(a).
Cf. Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real Activities
Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 363 (2006) (stating that, unlike man·
agement forecasts, analyst forecasts can continue beyond the year-end until
shortly before the earnings announcement date, and that, during the year, management can form expectations of the analysts' final consensus forecast outstanding prior to the management's earnings announcement).
175 See, e.g., Atiase et al., supra note 171, at 522 n.12; Leonard Soffer, S.
Ramu Thiagarajan & Beverly R. Walther, Earnings Preannouncement Strategies, 5 REV. ACCT. STU. 5, 5 (2000).
176 In 2013, the CSRC began to require IPO and listed issuers to disclose their
government subsidy-related information in notes to annual financial statements. See CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N, CSRC 2013-38: IPO AND LISTED ISSUER
DISCLOSURE INTERPRETIVE GUIDE No. 2---GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY DISCLOSURE
IN NOTES TO ANNuAL FiNANCIAL STATEMENTS (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub
/zjhpublic/g003062011201309/P020130927528247963554.doc [https://perma.cc
/EH9K-UJGH].
m See Anne Beyer, Capital Markets Prices, Management Forecasts, and
Earnings Management, 84 ACCT. REV. 1713, 1723--25 (2009); Ron Kasznik, On
the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 37 J.
ACCT. RES. 57, 61--62, 79--80 (1999).
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government's strategic, selective subsidies to listed firms are
"pervasive," with the government pursuing its socio-political
agenda via the listed issuers, and issuers managing earnings using
the government subsidies to meet regulatory requirements or market expectations.1 78 Separate tabulations of government subsidies
in both furecasted and reported earnings will ensure a comparable
basis for measuring forecast errors, bringing greater transparency
to issuer forecasting ability and enhancing fairness of the forecast
accuracy-based public enforcement.t79 Furthermore, since operating income and non-core earnings are shown to have different
implications for firm valuation, tao separate disclosure of the government subsidy component in earnings forecasts and earnings
reports may help avoid any misleading inferences about firm value
or its risk.tBt
Third, with respect to discretionary or voluntary disclosure,
literature has told "a compelling economic story''1B2 that, in the
presence of firm proprietary costs or investor uncertainty about
firm information, and consistent with efficient disclosure choicessuch as by comparing the information asymmetry component of
the cost of capital with the disclosure-related proprietary costsfirms will neither fully disclose nor totally withhold information
about firm value, despite the fact that the market rationally

178 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Martin Walker & Cheng Zeng, Do Chinese Government Subsidies Affect Firm Value?, 39 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y 149, 149-52
(2014); Xingzhi Xiao & Yipan Wang, Subsidy for Innovation: Is It Solely Applied
to Innovation?, 4 ECON. MGMT. 19, 25, 29 (2014); Qingquan Tang & Danglun Luo,
Motives and Consequences of Government Subsidies to Chinese Listed Issuers:
An Empirical Study, 6 FIN. RES. 149, 154 (2007).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 107-11, 128; infra text accompanying notes 206-11; see also liANwEN CHEN, SECURITIES MARKETS AND
ACCOUNTING REGULATION 228 (Beijing, China Fin. & Econ. Pub. House 2001)

(suggesting that, in computing forecast errors for enforcement purposes,
"recurring earnings" should be separated from "nonrecurring earnings" in
order to have a consistent and comparable basis).
180 Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth & Daniel Gao, The Information Content
of Earnings Components: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market, 20 EUR.
ACCT. REV. 669, 673 (2011).
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(2) (2016); Guides for Disclosure of Projections
of Future Economic Performance, supra note 26, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,248; see
also supra note 177.
182 See Verrecchia, supra note 3, at 160.
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interprets the withheld information_183 Economic literature has
also stated that it is inefficient for firms to precommit to a policy
of full disclosure.184 The Chinese regulatory policy imposing obligations on voluntary disclosers to timely update their earnings
projections and to follow up disclosing variances 185 in effect presents firms with an inefficient "precommitment mechanism of
full disclosure" akin to "getting on a treadmill that one cannot get
off,"l86 which will discourage voluntary disclosure. To encourage
voluntary projections, the voluntary regime should create an economically efficient disclosure environment, allowing issuers to
append a forewarning to a projection that the projection is not
intended to be updated, to postpone updating with a timely cautionary explanation, or to suspend an issued projection against
any continued use_187 This could be accomplished via a current
183 Id. at 141--47, §§ 3.5, 4.2 (expounding efficiency-based voluntary disclosure
theory); Ronald Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, 23 J. AcCT.
RES. 123, §§ 1, 3 (1985) (extending the Grossman-Milgrom unraveling idea in
stating that investor uncertainty about management's information endowment
induces partial disclosure); Robert Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 179, §§ 1, 5 (1983) (extending the Grossman-Milgrom unraveling idea in stating that proprietary costs raise the equilibrium threshold level
of disclosure and introduce noise to possible interpretations of withheld information). For the original Grossman-Milgrom unraveling idea, see Sanford J.
Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about
Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 462--63, 465 (1981) (stating that rational expectations of the buyer propel full disclosure by the seller to maximize
profit); Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems
and Applications, 12 BELLJ. ECON. 380, § 5 (1981) (stating that, at a sequential equilibrium, the buyer's attitude is one of extreme skepticism and the
salesman's best strategy is one offull disclosure).
184 See Verrecchia, supra note 3, at 146-47, 155.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35, 145. The SEC adopts a
similar policy on duty to update and variance disclosure. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b)(3)(ii)--{iii) (2016); supra text accompanying notes 22--23.
186 See Verrecchia, supra note 3; John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey &
Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting,
40 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 3, § 6.2.1 (2005); see also Oesterle, supra note 29.
187 See AI CPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION§§ 8.48--8.51
(2013); see also Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
("[A] statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning,
and there is a change, correction, more exactly, further disclosure, may be
called for.").
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report, 188 based on the disclosure cost-benefit determination made
by the issuer, and absent any manipulative intent on the part of
the issuer to inflate or deflate its stock price.189

B. Some Building Blocks for Ex Ante Regulation of
Issuer Projections
I. Issuer Safe Harbor Conditional on Audit Review

The requirement of audit review of issuer earnings projections
currently depends on three circumstances. Transaction-triggered
issuer earnings projections, such as those made in connection with
188 In 1975, the SEC proposed the integration of issuers' voluntary public
projections into the disclosure system of the federal securities laws, including
a requirement to file a Form 8-K when the issuer ''has reason to believe that
its public projections no longer have a reasonable basis or has determined to
cease disclosing or revising projections." See Future Economic Performance
Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,317. In 1976, the SEC withdrew
its proposal, "[d]ue to the important legal, disclosure policy and technical issues raised by the commentators." &e False or Misleading Statements in the
Solicitation of Proxies; Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5699, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,371, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,932, 19,932 (May 14, 1976). The voluntary projection policy adopted by the SEC since 1978 does not require a Form
8-K filing for updating or discontinuing projections. See Guides for Disclosure
of Projections of Future Economic Performance, supra note 26, 43 Fed. Reg.
at 53,247; 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3) (2016); cf Additional Form 8-K Disclosure
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,604 (2004); Current
Report (Form 8-K: Item 4.02) (OMB Exp. Mar. 31, 2018).
189 See, e.g., Stephen Baginski, John Hassell & Michael Kimbrough, Why
Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 5 (2004)
(stating that demand for forward-looking information may vary across firms and
through time while costs of disclosure remain potentially high, and that managers are likely to disclose only when the benefits of meeting the demand exceed the costs of supplying the disclosure); D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce & Shankar
Venkataraman, Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework,
22 ACCT. HORIZONS 315, 324 (2008) (citing studies documenting that managers' forecasting behaviors can be influenced by their own self-interest, such
as different managerial incentives in connection with equity-based compensation, around equity offerings, during stock option award periods, or when engaging in insider trading). The issuer's "disclosure cost-benefit'' determination and
absence of "manipulative intent'' standard proposed by this Article stands in
contrast to the SEC's "reasonable basis'' standard, for updating, discontinuing,
and resuming voluntary projections. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii)-{iv) (2016);
see supra text accompanying notes 23, 31-32.
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a public offering or a related party SAR transaction, are required
to be attested by a qualified accounting firm regardless of whether
such projections are mandatory or voluntary.190 Listed issuers' voluntary earnings projections with a full-year projection horizon are
also required to be attested by a qualified accounting firm. 191
Benchmark Issuers' mandatory earnings forecasts made in connection with their periodic and current reporting are not subject
to any audit review at all_192
To encourage issuer voluntary forecast disclosure,193 and for
the market to benefit from informational intermediaries' monitoring role over issuer forecasting process, 194 this Article recommends a safe harbor for issuer projections conditioned on an
advance audit review of the projections. Such an audit review
could be performed by a qualified public accounting firm 195 or by
See supra Parts LA-LB.
See supra Part I. C.
192 Id.
193 See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities
Act Release No. 5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, 38 Fed. Reg. 7220, 7221
190
191

(Mar. 19, 1973) ("[O]ne of the primary deterrents to a rational and open disclosure system for projections is the fear of liability for inaccurate projections.");
Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K Nelson, The Impact of Securities
Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High
Technology Firms, 39 J. AcCT. REs. 297, 305, 323 (2001) (sampling firms in high
technology industries in the two years immediately surrounding the 1995
enactment of the PSLRA and finding increased levels of voluntary earnings
forecasts in response to the PSLRA, and finding neither improvement nor
deterioration in forecast quality following the PSLRA enactment); see also
supra Table 5.
194 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687-89 (1984) (commenting
on the role of accountants as informational intermediaries); George Blazenko
& William Scott, A Model of Standard Setting in Auditing, 3 CONTEMP. AcCT.
RES. 68, 69 (1986) (commenting on auditing as a monitoring device); AlCPA,
FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, § 301.29-30 (describing
the attestation process as involving the following: evaluating the preparation
of the prospective financial statements, the support underlying their assumptions, and their presentation; and, on the basis of such examination, rendering an opinion on whether the prospective financial statements are presented
in conformity with AlCPA Guide Prospective Financial Information and
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's forecast or for management's projection given the hypothetical assumptions).
196 For a registered public accounting firm in China to engage in "securities
and futures-related business," it must be jointly qualified by and subject to the
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the issuer's board of directors' audit committee_196 An ex ante audit
review of the support for management's material assumptions,
coupled with an ex ante management disclosure of probability
distributions or other probabilistic statements relating to its projections, is superior to management's ex ante disclosure of material assumptions and its ex post analysis of historical variances
as are currently required_l97 The ex ante assumption disclosure
may harm the firm's competitive interests, while the ex post variance analysis may be of limited utility to users of projections in a
significantly changing business environment. taB A foundation for
joint supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the CSRC. "Securities and
futures-related business" is defined to mean auditing, verification, examination,
and attestation engagements (e.g., auditing of financial statements and attestation of earnings projections) performed for "securities and futures firms."
"Securities and futures firms" refer to issuers, securities trading, clearing, and
settlement intermediaries, stock and futures exchanges, investment funds, and
investment management companies. &e Ministry of Finance & China Sec. Reg.
Comm'n, MOF 2012-2: Notice Concerning Securities and Futures-Related
Business Qualification of Public Accounting Firms, arts. 1, 6-7 (20 12) (Westlaw China JJlt (Westlaw China)). As of December 31, 2013, there were forty
such qualified firms. See MINISTRY OF FINANCE & CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N,
MOF-CSRC 2014-13: LIST OF SECURITIES-QUALIFIED PuBLIC ACCOUNTING
FIRMS (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/G00306213/201
403/W020 140310620717659195.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9WW-Z382].
196 &e, e.g., Bruce J. McConomy, Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings
Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
167, 189--90 (1998) (documenting that, in the Canadian market, auditing of
management forecasts reduced forecasting bias but not forecast errors); Irene
Karamanou & Nikos Vafeas, The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit
Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 43
J. ACCT. RES. 453, 481 (2005) (finding that, in the U.S. market, effective board
audit committees were related to greater forecast accuracy in both good news
and bad news samples); see also HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE
DISCWSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PuRPoSE 281-82 (1979) (emphwrizing
the importance of independent judgmental opinions on soft information, and
recommending that the accounting profession act as ombudsman in the public
interest and participate in attestation functions on disclosures that are judgmental and nonobjective).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 61, 127, 135. The SEC adopts a similar policy favoring ex ante assumption disclosure and ex post variance disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2016); supra note 26.
198 For literature supporting this view, see, for example, AICPA, GUIDE
FOR A REVIEW OF A FINANCIAL FORECAST 4 7-48 (2nd ed. 1982) (encouraging
forecast preparers to develop ranges, probabilistic statements, or estimates of
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the safe harbor thus is for the Chinese issuers and the accounting
profession to develop adequate standards and presentation guidelines for the preparation and attestation of issuer projections. 199
2. Open and Transparent Legal Framework a Necessary
Complement to Safe Harbor
A "Fidelity-based capital markets legal and regulatory system"
was espoused by the State Council in 2004.200 In 2006, the CSRC
adopted a confidential "Program of Action for Fidelity Building
in Securities and Futures Markets"; in 2008, the CSRC launched
a confidential "Central Fidelity File System for Securities and
Futures Markets." Both actions by the CSRC were designed to
record legal, regulatory, and administrative violations by capital
error to supplement the determination of the single most probable forecasted
financial result); John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14 J. CORP. L. 547, § VILA (1989) (recommending management disclosure of probability distributions associated with forecasts); Verrecchia, supra
note 183, at 181-82, 191 (1983) (positing that proprietary cost of disclosure may
arise from both favorable and unfavorable information, particularly for firms
in highly competitive industries); AlCPA, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ch. 7 (1973) (stating that changes in technology, industry conditions, businesses, and management may make the future
significantly different from the past and that detailed presentation of assumptions supporting forecasts may adversely affect the firm's competitive position).
199 The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) issued
two pronouncements in 1996 and 2006 governing attestation of "earnings projections'' and "prospective financial information" respectively. See CICPA,
1996-456 BULLETIN NO. 4: ATTESTATION OF EARNINGS PROJECTIONS (1997)
(Westlaw China JJj$ (Westlaw China)); CICPA, 2006-X Standard No. 3111:
Attestation of Prospective Financial Information (2007) (Westlaw China JJj$
(Westlaw China)). Both pieces have been criticized by accounting academics
for being "so incomplete and inadequate as to greatly increase audit risks."
See, e.g., Yaoming Jiang, Prospective Financial Information Disclosure and
Regulation: Drawing on the U.S. Experience, 12 CONTEMP. FIN. & ECON. 101,
103 (2007); cf AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4,
§ 301; AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION (2013).
200 See State Council, SC 2004-3: Opinion on Further Development and
Reform of Capital Markets § 7 (2004) (Westlaw China JJj$ (Westlaw China)).
The State Council "is the executive organ of the highest national authority, and
is the highest national administrator." NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., CONSTITUTION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA § 3.3 (2004) (Westlaw China JJj$
(Westlaw China)); cf U.S. CONST. art. II.
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markets participants, and to provide for the use of such data by
the CSRC in its future administrative, regulatory, and enforcement actions relating to such parties. 201 In 2012, the CSRC published the Securities and Futures Markets Fidelity Regulation
(Provisional), 202 which, as amended in 2014, specifies eight categories of persons whose Fidelity files are collected in the Central
Fidelity File System. 203 In 2014, the Central Fidelity File System
was expanded to become an inter-governmental information
sharing platform, so that "any capital markets Fidelity violator
will be punished and dealt with not only by the CSRC but also
similarly by other governmental agencies."204
201 &e, e.g., Instilling a Fidelity Culture in the Securities Industry, CIDNA SEC.
REG. COMM'N JJANGXI PROVINCE BRANCH (Mar. 11, 2014), http://sdqyxc.dzwww
.com/dybg/201403/t20140311_9445940.htm; CmNA SEC. REG. COMM'N, TwENTY
YEARS OF CIDNA'S CAPITAL MARKETS ch. 25 (2010) (BEIJING: ClllNA CITIC PRESS
2010); CIDNA SEC. REG. COMM'N, CSRC BULLETIN 2008-11: CENTRAL FIDELITY
FILE SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES AND FuTURES MARKETS LAUNCHED (Nov. 24, 2008),
http:/lwww.csrc.gov.cn/publnewsite/zjhxwfblxwddl200812ft20081226_68639.html
[https://perma.cc1QJ69-6DZK].
202 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-80: Securities and Futures Markets
Fidelity Regulation (Provisional) (2012) (Westlaw China JJ~ (Westlaw China)).
203 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-106: Securities and Futures
Markets Fidelity Regulation (Provisional) (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub
/zjhpublic/G0030620 1120 1409/P020 140919480923759622. pdf [https://perma.cc
IXC66-PLJ4] [hereinafter Fidelity Regulation]. Persons covered by the Central
Fidelity File System include:
issuers and their officers, directors, major stockholders, and
controlling persons; securities and futures firms and their associated persons; investment management firms and their associated persons; investment research firms and their associated
persons; professional services organizations serving the securities and futures industries, such as accounting firms, asset
appraisal firms, credit rating agencies, law firms, public relations firms, investor relations firms, and computer software and
hardware providers, and employees of such professional services organizations; domestic and foreign institutional investors and their fund managers; representative offices of foreign
securities-type firms in China; and any person with securities
and futures markets-related Fidelity regulation violations.
Id. art. 7.
204 See Capital Markets Fidelity File System Launched, CHINA SEC. REG.
COMM'N (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/publnewsite/zjhxwfblxwdd/2014
08/t20140808_258971.html [https://perma.cci5N54-K7WG].
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Among others, 205 the following earnings disclosure-related
events are recorded in the Central Fidelity File System:
(1) An issuer fails to disclose a mandatory earnings
forecast, or fails to timely disclose a material update to its previous earnings disclosure whether
mandatory or voluntary, or a material disparity exists between the issuer's forecasted or preannounced earnings and actual reported earnings.2oa
(2) Under a stock exchange's disclosure rating scale
declining from A to D, an issuer is given a Disclosure Rating D due to the sign error of its annual
earnings projection or preannouncement, such as a
projected or preannounced profit versus an actual
loss, or vice versa; is given a Disclosure Rating C
due to its over-projection or over-preannouncement
of annual earnings by a threshold 50 percent; or is
denied a Disclosure Rating A (regardless of its other
disclosure performance) due to its over-projection or
over-preannouncement of annual earnings by a
threshold 20 percent.207
(3) An SAR counterpart did not live up to its undertakings made in connection with an SAR transaction. 20s
206 The Fidelity Regulation lists twelve categories of Fidelity Information.
See CSRC 2014-106, supra note 203, art. 8.
206 SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2013-4: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE
RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINARY AND REGULATORY ACTIONS, art. 19(5) (2013),
http://www.sse.eom.cn/lawandrules/sserules/organization/clc_20130620_3722134
.shtml [https://perma.cc/8E44-US4R]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2013-14:
PuBLIC CENSURE CRITERIAAPPLICARLE TO SME ISSUERS, art. 5 (2013) http://www
.szse.cn/main/files/20 13/01/16/981797909583.pdf [https://perms.cc/UM5X-HCGG];
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2011-103: PuBLIC CENSURE CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO CHINEXT ISSUERS, art. 5 (2011), http://www.szse.cn/main/rule/bsywgz
/397 45335.shtml [https://perma.cc/QQ3U-663Z].
207 See, e.g., SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2013-112: LiSTED ISSUER DISCLOSUREPERFORMANCERATINGGUIDE, arts. 17(4), 17(16), 18(4), 18(16), 19(5) (2013),
http://www.szse.cn/mainlimages/2013/04/08/20130408172252427.pdf [https:/1
perma.cc/3EYH-XKL4]; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2015-X: LiSTED ISSUER
DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE RATING GUIDE, arts. 24(5), 25(2) (2015), http://
www.sse.eom.cn/aboutuslhotandd/ssenews/clc_20150427_3915726.shtml [https:/1
perma.cc/D2EL-ACFE].
208 CSRC 2014-106, supra note 203, art. 8(4).
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(4) An underwriter sponsored the offering of an issuer
who over-projected earnings by a threshold 20 percent during the underwriter's post-offering continuing sponsorship period (which lasts between two to
four years depending on the listing board of the issuer and IPO or follow-on offering).209 An accountant
signed the attestation report on an issuer's earnings
projections made in connection with a public offering,
where the issuer over-projected earnings by a threshold 20 percent.2to A financial advisor advised the issuer with respect to an SAR transaction, an assets
appraiser signed the SAR assets appraisal report,
and an accountant signed the SAR earnings projection attestation report, where earnings attributable
to the issuer or the purchased assets were overprojected by a threshold 20 percent.211
In stark contrast to the confidential public enforcement, the
Chinese Securities Law has never expressly authorized any private rights of action for materially false or misleading statements,
whether in forward-looking disclosure or otherwise. 212 To fill the
legislative void,213 the Adjudication Committee of the Chinese
CSRC 2009-63, supra note 43, arts. 11, 36, 72(6).
CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, arts. 55-56; CSRC 2006-30, supra note 66,
art. 67.
211 Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2008-54: Regulation of Listed Issuer M&A
Financial Advisors, arts. 38, 40 (2008), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic
/G00306207/200807/t20080708_25655.htm [https://perma.cc/985A-RQSU];
CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82, art. 59.
212 See SECURlTIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 207; SECURITIES LAW 2004,
supra note 52, art. 207; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2005-43: SECURITIES LAW
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 232 (2006) (Westlaw Chlna /J1f
(Westlaw China)); NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2013-5: SECURlTIES LAW OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 232 (2013) (Westlaw Chlna 7J1f (Westlaw
Chlna)); SECURlTIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, art. 232.
213 Under the Chinese Law of Legislation in effect as of 2000, national
legislative power resided exclusively in the National People's Congress (NPC)
and the Standing Committee of the NPC: the NPC was to legislate in the areas
of "fundamental laws" and the Standing Committee in other areas as well as
when the NPC was in recess. The power to interpret law resided exclusively in
the Standing Committee, and its legal interpretations had the same force and
effect as law. See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2000-31: LAW OF LEGISLATION OF
209

210
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Supreme People's Court (SPC), the highest court in China,2I4
has released four judicial interpretations since 2001 addressing
securities-related private causes of action:
(1) Notice of Non-Acceptance of Securities-Related Private Damage Actions ('SPC 2001"), citing ''legislative

and judicial constraints";2I5
(2) Notice of Acceptance of Private Tort Actions on Account of Securities-Related False Statement ("SPC
2002"), acknowledging China's WTO member obligation to provide judicial relief;2I6
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 7, 42, 47 (2000) (Westlaw China JJ:fllt
(Westlaw China)).
In a puzzling twist, the Organizational Law of the People's Courts, which took
effect in 2007, grants the Chinese Supreme People's Court the "power to interpret laws" without any case or controversy before it. See STAND. COMM. OF THE
NPC, PRC 2006-59: ORGANIZATIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 32 (2007) (Westlaw China JJ:fllt (Westlaw
China)); cf U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
Perhaps aware of the inconsistency between the Law of Legislation and the
Organizational Law of the People's Courts, in August of 2014, the Legislative
Sub-Committee of the NPC Standing Committee proposed amending the Law
of Legislation to, inter alia, add an article to recognize the Supreme People's
Court's power to interpret law without any case adjudication-a power to be
shared with the NPC Standing Committee-provided that any such judicial
interpretation by the Supreme People's Court be filed with the NPC Standing
Committee within 30 days of its pronouncement. See LEGISLATIVE SUB-COMM.
OF NPC STANDING COMM., NPC 2014-00: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE LAW
OF LEGISLATION , 28 (2014) (Westlaw China ::ff:fllt (Westlaw China)). The
amendment was enacted on March 15, 2015. See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC
2015-20: LAW OF LEGISLATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF C!llNA, art. 104
(2015) (Westlaw China ::ff:fllt (Westlaw China)).
214 See PRC 2006-59, supra note 213, art. 29. The "Adjudication Committee"
is the management body of the Supreme People's Court, whose meetings may
be attended by the prosecutorial branch of the government. Id. art. 10; cf U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
215 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2001-406: Notice of Non-Acceptance of
Securities-Related Private Damage Actions (2001) (Westlaw China JJ :flit
(Westlaw China)).
216 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2002-X: Notice of Acceptance of Private Tort
Actions on Account of Securities-Related False Statement (2002) (Westlaw
China JJ:fllt (Westlaw China)). See also GUOGUANG LI & WEI JIA, PRIVATE
DAMAGES FOR SECURITIES-RELATED FALSE STATEMENTS 262 (BEIJING: LAW
PRESS 2003).
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(3) Certain Substantive and Procedural Requirements

Governing Adjudication of Private Damage Actions
on Account of Securities-Related False Statement
(''SPC 2003"), hailed by its drafter as "the first
comprehensive judicial interpretation of law governing securities-related private action adjudication,"
"supplementing criminal and administrative enforcement with an indispensable private enforcement conditional on the former'';217 and
(4) Pronouncement Concerning Adjudication of Private
Tort and Damage Actions on Account of Untrue Audit
Report (''SPC 2007").218
In essence,219 under SPC 2003, if an administrative penalty by
the CSRC or another governmental agency or a criminal sanction
by a court has been imposed on a defendant for a securities-related
false statement, a private party220 may bring a civil damage action against the defendant for that false statement. 221 Potential
defendants under the SPC 2003 are the following: (1) the issuer, its
controlling shareholder and de facto controlling person, members
of the board of directors, board of supervision, and management;
217 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2003-2: Certain Substantive and Procedural
Requirements Governing Adjudication of Private Damage Actions on Account
of Securities-Related False Statement (2003) (Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw
China)). See also LI & JIA, supra note 216, at 281, 284.
21• Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2007-12: Pronouncement Concerning Adjudication
of Private Tort and Damage Actions on Account of Untrue Audit Report (2007)
(Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw China)).
21" For a detailed analysis of the SPC Judicial Interpretation 2003-2 by its
drafter, see LI & JIA, supra note 216.
220 The suit must be brought as an "individual action" or a "joint action"
where there are multiple plaiotiffs. In a joint action, the plaintiffs shall elect
(or the court shall appoint where the plaintiffs fail to so elect) two to five plaintiff representatives. The court will publish a notice of action and all putative
plaintiffs must register with the court in time to be eligible to join the joint action and to elect or be elected as plaiotiff representatives. Parties who did not
register with the court but subsequently brought a separate action within the
statute of limitations will be bound by the judicial decision rendered in the joint
action. See SPC 2003-2, supra note 217, § 3; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2012-59:
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 52--54
(2013) (Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw China)).
221 See SPC 2003-2, supra note 217, art. 5.
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(2) intermediaries such as underwriters, offering and listing spon-

soring firms, accounting firms, law firms, assets appraisal firms,
and their employees with direct responsibility for the false statement; and (3) any other person who made the false statement. 222
"Securities-related false statement" is defined to mean "an untrue statement contrary to facts, a misleading statement, a material omission, or a disclosure improper as to timing or method,
with respect to any 'material events' set forth in the Securities
Law."223 In addition,224 under the SPC 2007, a private party who
reasonably relied upon or otherwise used an untrue audit report
in its transactions with the audited firm,225 or in trading the
audited firm's securities, may sue the auditor for damages caused
thereby without government action, prerequisite but conditional
on the audited firm and its fraudulent stockholders being codefendants.226 "Untrue audit report" is defined to mean "an audit
report containing any untrue statement, misleading statement,
or material omission."227
This Article contends that neither Fidelity regulation nor the
Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretations (SPC 2003 and
SPC 2007) obviate the need for a private right of action for
I d. art. 7.
Id. art. 17. See also SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, arts. 59--62,
72; SECURITIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, arts. 63, 65--67, 78.
222
223

224

For a detailed analysis of the SPC Judicial Interpretation 2007-12 by
its drafter, see Crv. Drv. No. 2 OF SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. (Xiaoming Xi ed.); TORT
AND DAMAGE LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS FOR AUDITS: AN ANALYSIS OF SuPREME PEoPLE'S COURT'S JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (Beijing: The People's Court
Press 2007).
225 SPC 2007-12, supra note 218, art. 2. According to its drafter, SPC 2007-12
contemplates as plaintiffs both investors trading the audit client firm's securities and persons who have transactional or contractual relationships with the
audit client firm (such as lenders and suppliers of the firm). See XI, supra
note 224, at 71; cf. "In connection with" concept under U.S. securities law. See,
e.g., Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1069 (2014) (citing SEC
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)) ("warning against 'construing' the
phrase 'in connection with' 'so broadly as to convert any common-law fraud
that happens to involve securities into a § 10(b) violation"').
226 SPC 2007-12, supra note 218, arts. 1-3. Any damages shall be paid first
by the audited firm and its fraudulent stockholders, and then by the auditor
to the extent of any unpaid damage and in proportion to the auditor's fault.
Id. art. 10.
227 Id. art. 2.
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fraudulent forward-looking information. First, regulation by Fidelity File per se does not bring injured investors any economic
relief although it may result in government allocation of resources.
This is achieved by the government denying an inaccurate forecasting issuer and rewarding an accurate forecaster with access
to the capital markets, and imposing on the former other immediate and real-not merely future and reputational-penalties.22s
Second, "securities-related false statement" is defined by the
SPC 2003 by reference to the Securities Law's listing of "material
events," which in turn are defined as the occurrences of the specified events. 229 "Untrue audit report" is defined by the SPC 2007
22s See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 107-11, 128, 204. It is a
questionable conclusion that "public criticisms have significant effects on
[Chinese]listed companies and their executives." See Benjamin L. Liebman &
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929--30, Part III (2008). Rather, it is the real benefits the
CSRC denies to, or the real costs the CSRC imposes on, an issuer and other
related market participants in conjunction with a public criticism that produce
the stock price effect or otherwise adversely affect the parties involved. See,
e.g., Yunling Song & Xinwei Ji, Enforcement Actions and Their Effectiveness in
Securities Regulation: Empirical Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts, 5 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 59, 61-62 n.2 (2012) (stating that market reaction in an event study reflects the informational content of the issuer's fraud
and not of the regulator's effectiveness); Donghua Chen, Yuyan Guan, Gang
Zhao & Feifei Wu, Securities Regulation and Implicit Penalties, 4 CHINAJ. AcCT.
REs. 47, 48 (2011) (stating that a reduction in the market share of the underwriting business suffered by the underwriters associated with their IPO client issuers' violations was not due to any reputational effect but was due to the CSRC's
real penalties imposed on the underwriters for their clients' violations); see
also Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 3, 7 (1996).
229 The Securities Law specifies twelve "material events":
For the purposes of current reporting, occurrence of any of the
following shall constitute a "material event": (1) any material
change to the business policy and business scope of the company;
(2) company decision concerning material investment or material assets acquisition; (3) company entering into a significant
contract potentially having significant impact on its assets, liability, equity, and results of operations; (4) company incurring
or default on a material debt; (5) company suffering material
operating or other losses; (6) material changes to the conditions
external to the company business operations; (7) changes to any
director of board, one third of board of supervision, or any senior
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with respect to "auditing activities prescribed in the Law of the
People's Republic of China Governing Certified Public Accountants," which do not include attestation of prospective financial
information. 230 Thus, private causes of action under the SPC 2003
or the SPC 2007 are based on information of current and historical
facts only, to the exclusion of forward-looking information. 23 1
Lastly, while conditioning private actions on successful government action may prevent "frivolous litigation'' and "entrepreneurial lawyer" abuses, 232 unchecked agency discretion may leave
management of the company; (8) sizable change in ownership
or control of any 5 percent shareholders or de facto controlling
person(s) of the company; (9) company decision to reduce its
share capital, merge, divest, dissolve, or apply for bankruptcy;
(10) any major litigation involving the company; a resolution
of the shareholder meeting or of the board of directors being
nullified or declared invalid by law; (11) company or any mem·
hers of its board of directors, board of supervision, or manage·
ment being subject to criminal investigation; and (12) such other
events as may be specified by the State Council securities
regulatory agency.
See SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 67. The CSRC'slist oftwenty·one
material events is generally similar to the Securities Law's list of twelve ma·
terial events, although it contains greater detail. See CSRC 2007 ·40, supra
note 76, art. 30; see also supra text accompanying note 223.
230 See SPC 2007·12, supra note 218, art. 1; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC
2014·14: LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBIJC OF CHINA GOVERNING CERTIFIED
PUBIJC ACCOUNTANTS, art. 14 (2014) (Westlaw China ]Jj$ (Westlaw China));
see also supra text accompanying note 227.
231 Not surprisingly, neither the ten·year (2002--2011) review of private
securities litigation in China nor the five·year (2007-2011) assessment of the
CSRC's sanctions against listed issuers documented any single case based on
an issuer's fraudulent forward· looking statement. See Robin Hui Huang, Pri·

vate Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten· Year Retrospective and
Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 763-64 (2013); Weixia Gu, Secu·
rities Arbitration in China: A Better Alternative to Retail Shareholder Protec·
tion, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 283, 290--91 n.29 (2013); see also XINMIN LIU,
THE ESSENTIALS OF THE CHINESE SECURITIES LAWS 275 n.2 (Beijing, Peking
Univ. Press 2013) (stating that the "securities·related false statement" within
the meaning of SPC 2003 refers to historical information, and thus does not
reach forward·looking statements); BING PENG, CHINESE SECURITIES REGULA·
TION 343 (Beijing, Higher Edu. Press 2007) ("As of current time, there has never
been a single case of civil damage action based on material disparity between
projected earnings and realized earnings.").
232 Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S.240, S.667, and H.R.1058: Hear·

ings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
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investors at the mercy of "regulatory capture."233 More specifically
under China's institutional setting, the government is the controlling shareholder of most large issuers in most industry sectors. 234
Both the securities regulators and the judiciary are part of the
centralized government system.235 The confidential Central Fidelity File System creates an informational asymmetry between the
regulated firms and the public investors,236 which, worsened by
an undefined "force majeure" exoneration power wielded by the
regulators,237 makes discretionary public enforcement real.
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 104-157, 4 (1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher
J. Dodd); see also Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities
Act Release No. 7101, Exchange Act Release No. 34,831, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723,
52,732 (1994) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Concept Release] (soliciting comments
on conditioning private antifraud actions on successful Commission fraud action); Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1107, 1110 (1999) (proposing an SEC-supervised mandatory arbitration program for private securities claims against public companies as the
best means to eliminate frivolous suits, citing the SEC's reputation as a tough,
fair, and pro-investor regulator).
233 See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 §liLA
(2002). For a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical literatures on
regulatory capture, see Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 203 (2006).
234 See supra Tables 1-2.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 213-14; see also Walter Hutchens,
Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal
System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 599 §§ 3.3, 3.5 (2003); Donghua Chen,
Dequan Jiang, Shangkun Liang & Fangping Wang, Selective Enforcement of
Regulation, 4 CHINAJ. AcCT. REs. 9 (2011) (examining the CSRC enforcement
data for the period 1994-2008 and finding that SOEs received less severe
punishments than privately controlled issuers, and that central SOEs received
lighter punishments than local SOEs); Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, &
Wenfeng Wu, The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on
Corporate Litigation in China, 54 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2011) (examining litigation data for the period from 1999--2005 and finding evidence of court bias
in favor of state-controlled issuers).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 204-18; see also B6, supra note 233,
at 210 (expounding a three-tier hierarchical agency model comprising three
parties: a political principal (the government), its delegate (the regulator), and
an agent (the regulated firm); and stating that asymmetric information between
the principal and the agent is the source of regulatory discretion, making regulatory capture, or regulator-firm collusion, possible).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 109, 128.
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This Article therefore recommends a model of private action
for materially false or misleading historical and forward-looking
information, conditioned on either the government's pre-action or
a showing by the private party of regulatory capture. Such an alternative avenue for private action should be designed both to
compensate for any existing regulatory failure and to deter future
captive relations between regulators and those they regulate. 238
Such a private action without the government action precondition could additionally be subject to a net social positive externality analysis. 239

3. Ex Ante Perspective of "Fact" and "Materiality" of
Projections Under Safe Harbor
Antifraud provisions in U.S. securities law proscribes any "untrue statement of a material fact,"240 not "untrue statements."241
A statement of "fact" and a statement of "opinion" differ most
importantly in the degrees of certainty and definiteness, and can
be mutually embedded242: an apparent "opinion" may have "fact"
cores, and vice versa.243 In 1994, the SEC noted an "implied factual
238 See Zinn, supra note 233, § IV.A; see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.ECON. &MGMT. SCI. 3, 17-18 (1971); Renee M.
Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 122--23 (2005).
239 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private
and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STuDIES 575 (1997)
(stating that a privately determined level of litigation can be socially excessive
or inadequate, and that corrective social policies may be needed to achieve a
socially optimal level of litigation).
240 See, e.g., 15 U.S. C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2), 77q(a)(2), 78n(e) (2012); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(b) (2016). The antifraud provisions also prohibit any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading. Id. Despite different elements and scopes of claims under the various
antifraud provisions, the fundamental concepts of "fact" and "materiality" are
common to all. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369
n.10, 372 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993).
241 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1325-26 (2015).
242 See id. at 1325, 1327.
243 See Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 256--57 (1973); see also Va. Bankshares v. Sandburg,
501 U.S. 1083, 1092, 1095--96 (1991) (stating that, in the proxy solicitation

520 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459
assertions" doctrine to determine "an untrue statement of fact" in
predictions and statements of opinion fur purposes of fraud liability:
A projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely
believed, (2) that there is a reasonable basis for that beliet; and
(3) that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts tending
to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement.
If a prediction was not believed when made or did not have a
valid basis, it would constitute an untrue statement of fact .... 244

Under the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Omnicare, Inc. v.
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 245
every statement of opinion "explicitly" affirms one fact: that the
speaker actually holds the stated belief. Thus, a false description
of one's own state of mind constitutes an untrue statement of fact;
context, directors' statements of reasons or belief "are factual in two senses:
as statements that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief
stated and as statements about the subject matter of the reason or belief
expressed." Equivalently, the statements of reasons do not misstate the
directors' reasons and do not mislead about the stated subject matter of the
reason); AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION § 1.03 (2013)
("Prospective financial statements are based on assumptions regarding future
events. The assumptions are in turn based on a combination of available
information and judgment, in which both history and plans play a part.").
244 Safe Harbor Concept Release, supra note 232, 59 Fed. Reg. at 52,727
(citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)).
See also Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 11-13 (No. 08-5442-cv) (Jan. 21, 2010),
Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that for purposes of the statutory safe harbor, a forward-looking statement contains at
least three implicit factual assertions, citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.,
886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)); Kripke, supra note 5, at 1198-99 ("[T]he
sole factual elements of a projection should be that it represents management's
view, that it was reached in a rational fashion and that it is a sincere view. Only
these elements can be subject to a statutory liability, not the eventuation of
the prophecy.").
245 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). While Omnicare addresses private claims under
Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, it may also affect both private and government actions under other "material misstatements and omissions" provisions
of the federal securities laws. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Vacatur and Remand 1-2 (No. 13-435) (June 2014), Omnicare,
Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318
(2015) [hereinafter United States, Omnicare Amicus Brief].
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conversely, an opinion actually held when made remains true even
if later proved to be erroneous. 246 A reasonable investor may make
inferences about the issuer's basis for its opinion; thus, if material facts conflict with a reasonable investor's expectations about
the basis, but are undisclosed, the opinion is misleading. 247 However, a reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known
to an issuer supports its opinion. Whether an opinion is misleading when the issuer knows, but fails to disclose, facts undermining its opinion depends on a fair reading of the opinion in its
full context. 248
Thus, the "untrue statement of fact" in an earnings projection
is not automatically the ex post discrepancy249 between projected
and realized earnings: that provision is not "an invitation to
Monday morning quarterback an issuer's opinions."250 Similarly,
an objectively based251 projection may nevertheless turn out to be
"objectively false" or ex post inaccurate. 252 But the U.S. securities
See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
See id. at 1328--29.
248 See id. at 1329--30; cf. supra text accompanying note 244. Under the
SEC's third "implied factual assertion," the SEC would automatically treat a
non-disclosure of certain fact "cutting the other way," or, disconfirming an opinion, as misleading. In contrast, the Omnicare Court takes a holistic "fair
reading" of an opinion "in its full context" approach to determine whether such
non-disclosure would cause the opinion to be misleading. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct.
at 1329--30.
248 See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514, 518 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("If all estimates are made carefully and honestly, half will turn
out too favorable to the firm and the other half too pessimistic. In either case
the difference may disappoint investors, who can say later that they bought
for too much (if the projection was too optimistic) or sold for too little (if the
projection turns out to be too pessimistic) .... The securities acts do not have
this ex post perspective.").
250 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327.
251 In evaluating whether an opinion is reasonably based, there is an interesting debate concerning whose perspective should be considered. Compare
Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327-28 n.5, 1330--31 n.ll ("objective" test that looks
at the perspective of a reasonable investor, which may include consistency with
industry practice or reliance on advice from regulators), with id. at 1336-37
(Scalis, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) \'subjective"
test that looks at the perspective of the speaker instead of the listener).
252 Professor Wendy Couture appeared to have erroneously conflated "objectively false" and "objectively unreasonable." See Wendy Gerwick Couture,
Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381 passim (2013);
246
247
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law antifraud provisions do not expose issuers to liability for mere
"untrue statements," and thus not for ex post inaccurate projections
that were genuinely believed and objectively based when made.253
Rather, the offense is the ex ante falsehood254...._be it an untrue
statement of one's truly-held projection (assuming materiality), 255
id. at 404 C"The falsity of an opinion is established only if it is both objectively
and subjectively false."); id. at 414 C'As this Article has argued so far ... an
opinion is only false if the speaker both objectively unreasonably and subjectively disbelieved it."). In reality, an issuer's projection that was genuinely
held and objectively based---t~uch as by relying on applicable regulations and
following professional guidelines and industry practice-may still turn out to
be inaccurate. To equate "objectively false" with "objectively unreasonable'' would
turn an antifraud-compliant projection into a "guarantee" of realization. "The
[Securities] Act does not go that far." See United States, Omnicare Amicus
Brief, supra note 245, at 30--31; see also AICPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION§ 7.01 (2013) ("The responsible party should have a reasonably objective basis to present a financial forecast .... The term reasonably
objective basis communicates to responsible parties a measure of the quality of
information that is necessary to present a financial forecast."); Kripke, supra
note 5.
The second error in Professor Couture's statement (that "[t]he falsity of an
opinion is established only if it is both objectively and subjectively false," see
supra, at 404) is that she conflates ex post and ex ante perspectives, and would
have the ex post outcome of an opinion partially determine or bear upon the
ex ante falsity of the opinion. But the U.S. federal securities laws distinguish
between ex ante and ex post perspectives, and do not Monday morning quarterback an issuer's opinion. See supra note 249; see also Omnicare, 135 S. Ct.
at 1327.
Thirdly, Professor Couture's "both objectively and subjectively false" or
"dual-falsity" proposition (see supra, at 404, 407) conflicts with the 1994 and 2010
SEC positions and the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court Omnicare decision. Both the
SEC and the Omnicare Court hold that an opinion is false either because it
falsely describes one's own state of mind or because it is not reasonably based.
To establish falsehood of an opinion does not require both. See supra text
accompanying note 244; Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326, 1328--29 n.6.
253 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325--26. The Author's argument here assumes that either there was no duty to update a projection or that such a duty
had been satisfied.
254 See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995)
1332 (''The securities laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective: just
as a statement true when made does not become fraudulent because things
unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materially false when made does not
become acceptable because it happens to come true.").
255 A temporal distinction (i.e., an inadvertent ex post correct result versus
an inadvertent ex ante correct assessment) exists between the two scenarios:
where an ex ante false projection happens to materialize due to unexpected
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or an omission of material facts conflicting with a reasonable
investor's fair inferences of the projection's basis. Only such ex
ante material misstatement or omission, rather than the ex post
non-eventuation ofthe projection, should be subject to liability.256
In contrast to such an ex ante perspective of "fact" in an opinion,
and consistent with their ex post perspective of "fact" in the definition of "securities-related false statement" as "an untrue statement contrary to facts," 257 Chinese securities regulators adopt a
bright-line approach to projection regulation. Ex ante, issuers are
required to expressly warrant the "accuracy" and "objectivity" of
their earnings projections.25B Ex post, the regulators penalize issuers for projection inaccuracies exceeding the regulatory thresholds
arbitrarily and uniformly set for all industries irrespective of their
characteristics or volatilities. 259 Such ex ante accuracy warranty
is counterproductive to investor protection, as users of projections
would be better served with information concerning uncertainty
associated with the projections, such as probability statements260
intervening events, and where a person thinks he is lying but is accidentally
actually telling the truth about the subject matter of his opinion. In the latter
"rare" case, courts have not imposed liability under Section 10(b) or Section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act or Section 11 of the Securities Act for such sheer
"impurities" of the "unclean heart." See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326 n.2 (citing Va. Bankaharea v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991) (quoting
Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)). The latter scenario would fail, but the former scenario may meet, the materiality teat. See
id.; see also supra note 254.
2 56 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. passim; see also Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465,
470 (2d Cir. 1978) (equating the claim to "alleging fraud by hindsight''); DiLeo
v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is
no "fraud by hindsight").
257 See supra text accompanying note 223.
258 See supra text accompanying note 140. While the stock exchanges mandate "accuracy" representation, the CSRC requires a "uniform" cautionary legend. See supra text accompanying note 61.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 128, 206--11; cf Sudip Datta,
Mai Iskandar-Datta & Vivek Sharma, Product market pricing power, industry
concentration and analysts' earnings forecasts, 35 J. BANK & FIN. 1352, 1352--53
(2011) (stating that firma in more concentrated industries are expected to have
higher earnings forecastability due to greater pricing power, whereas firms in
fragmented, competitive industries are expected to have lower earnings forecastability due to greater information complexity).
280 See supra text accompanying notes 197-98; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b)(3)(i) (2016) (exhorting forecasting issuers to caution investors
against attributing undue certainty to management projections); cf Beecher
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and meaningful caution.s.261 The ex post inaccuracy penalty mechanism motivates issuers' strategic projection behaviors, such as
"projecting" ex post facto 262 and earnings management, 263 to
achieve greater forecast accuracy.264 Issuer forecasts distorted by
such ex post policy deprive forecasting of its resource allocation
role.265 Public enforcement based solely on ex post variance can
result in mistaken liability or ''Type I error'' for good faith, reasonably made projections that do not materialize, thus discouraging
voluntary disclosure. It can also result in mistaken innocence or
"Type II error'' for fraudulent projections that happen to come true,
thus reducing enforcement deterrence.266 This Article recommends
v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[A] reasonably prudent investor would conclude [from an earnings forecast] that it was highly probable that
the forecast would be realized."); Kowal v. IBM (In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig.),
163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that statements regarding projections
of future performance may be actionable under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 if
they are worded as guarantees or are supported by specific statements of fact).
261 See Asher v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729, 734--35 (7th Cir. 2004).
An issuer's cautionary language accompanying the public projections may not
be "meaningful'' within the statutory safe harbor when it did not mention the
(or any of the) important sources of variance. Id. at 734. The safe harbor may
apply if the issuer can establish that ite "cautions did reveal what were, ex ante,
the major risks." Id. at 735. The statute "rules out a caution such as: 'This is a
forward-looking statement; caveat emptor.m Id. at 729; cf. supra text accompanying note 61 (discussing the CSRC's "uniform cautionary legend" requirement).
262 See supra Table 3.
263 See supra text accompanying note 178.
264 See Stephen P. Baginski, John M. Hassell & Michael D. Kimbrough, The
Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets, 77 ACCT. REV.
25, 48 (2002) (providing empirical evidence to demonstrate that the legal regime
is associated with management forecasting behavior); Jonathan L. Rogers &
Phillip C. Stocken, Credibility of Management Forecasts, 80 ACCT. REV. 1233,
1247 (2005) (concluding that earnings management can affect forecast errors).
265 See Martin Walker, Forecast Disclosure: An Information Economics
Perspective, 12 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 355, 368 (1985) (stating that benefits from
the allocation role of forecasts can only arise if the forecasts are made available in time for resource reallocation to take place); Ronald King, Grace
Pownall & Gregory Waymire, Expectations Adjustment via Timely Management Forecasts: Review, Synthesis, and Suggestions for Future Research, 9 J.
ACCT. LIT. 113, 124 (1990) (arguing that for a disclosure to adjust investor expectations, it must be credible, precise, and timely).
268 See A Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. EcoN. LIT. 45, 60--62 (2000) (discussing errors in
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introducing a "fact versus opinion" concept into the Chinese
securities laws' definition of "false statement," and a reorientation from the ex post variance-based naive enforcement267 to an ex
ante fact-based determination of falsehood in projections.
Where an issuer's projection contains a misstatement or an
omission as determined on an ex ante basis, materiality of the
falsehood26B must be ascertained for fraud liability to attach.269
Under U.S. case law, "a misrepresentation or omission is 'material'
if a reasonable investor would have considered the information
significant when contemplating a statutorily relevant investment
decision."270 The Chinese securities laws prescribe no general definition of "materiality" but define, in the context of required current
reporting of material events, a "material event'' as "the occurrence
of an event investors' knowledge of which may produce a substantial impact on the trading prices of the issuer's stock and/or
its derivatives."271
public enforcement of law); c{. RON LARsON & BETSY FARBER, ELEMENTARY
STATISTICS 323-24 (2nd ed. 2004) (defining Type I and Type II errors).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 128, 206--11.
268 A materiality assessment should be made of the misrepresentation or
omission, rather than of any particular categories of information as inherently
significant to investors. The latter approach is rightly criticized by a commentator as "add[ing] little discipline to the process" and "go[ing] beyond the
established legal standard." Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality
Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 Bus. LAW.
317, 327-28 (2007).
269 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1326--27, 1329 (2015) (noting that liabilities for opinion statements under Section ll's false statement provision and omissions
provision are both conditioned on materiality); see also Basic v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 237-38 (discussing materiality in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
context); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (discussing materiality in Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 context).
270 Chadbourne & Parke v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (citing Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318--19 (2011)). See also
Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327 ("[W]hether a statement is 'misleading' depends
on the perspective of a reasonable investor: The inquiry (like the one into
materiality) is objective.").
271 See SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 67; CSRC 2007-40, supra
note 76, art. 30; see also supra note 229; cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 230.408(a)
(2016), 240.12b-2, 240.12b-20 (2016) (requiring "such further material information" to be added to the information expressly required in a Securities Act
registration statement or an Exchange Act statement or report, as may be
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Whether under a "reasonable investor would consider significant" standard or a "substantial market price impact'' standard, 2 72
materiality of any factual falsehood in an earnings projection
should be evaluated on an ex ante basis, i.e., the effect on the reasonable investor or on the market price of the relevant security
at the time of the projection, rather than the subsequent time of
earnings realization. 273 Disclosure of realized earnings does not
necessary to make the reqlrired statements made not mialeacling; and defining the term "material'').
2 72 For a critical analyslil of the reasonable investor-baaed traditional model
versus the market price-based market model of the investment decision, see
generally Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1 (1983). For an argument that Basic and TSC Industries accommodate both definitions of materiality, see generally Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 517 (2014). See also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413-14 (2014) (elaborating on the four prerequisites for invoking the Basic presumption, stating that if a misrepresentation was immaterial, it would not have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the "total Jnix'' of information made available, and could
not have distorted the stock's market price).
273 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 272, at 6--7 n.19 (arguing that information
that is stale or not credible would be disregarded by the market); ARNOLD S.
JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:29 n.19
(2014) (''Materiality is measured when the alleged violation occurred."); see
also Future Economic Performance Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at
20,318 (stating that the determination as to compliance with the safe harbor
criteria would be based on the facts at the time the projection was disclosed).
Both the fraud-on-the-market theory and the truth-on-the-market theory point
to the time when the material misstatement or omission occurred. See Donald
C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-too-Market: Reflections on Amgen
and tlw Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARiz. L. REV. 37, 56 (2015) ("If the
facta at issue appear to be material, one can fairly presume that their misrepresentation or omission would necessarily distort the market price unless the
market somehow already knew the truth."). The term "price distortion" (or price
impact) should be clifferentiated from the term "price reaction" (or price change,
price move, price adjustment). Price distortion refers to the market price being
clifferent from what it otherwise would have been absent the misrepresentation.
Price reaction refers to the visible market price change as may be captured and
measured by an event study. A "confirmatory lie," ie., a misstatement made to
meet the existing market expectations, demonstrates the difference. A confirmatory lie at the time of its making may produce a fraudulent price distortion without producing any apparent price move, such as by preventing the
prevailing market price from falling. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Revisiting Basic, 69 Bus. LAw. 671, §§ III-A, III-D (2014).
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equate with the "corrective disclosure" in the event study sense. 274
By definition, corrective disclosure reveals the truth. 275 The "truth"
in a management earnings forecast is not, however, the "realized"
earnings but is the management's ex ante genuinely-held and
objectively based "expectation" of earnings.276 Similarly, the concept of "forecast error," measured as the difference between realized earnings and forecast earnings properly scaled, 277 does not
equate with the concept of "economic loss," measured by the difference between the artificial price paid and the corrected market
price when the truth is revealed.27B
A forecast error reflects both information arriving between
the earnings forecast date and the earnings report date and any
management bias or deviation from its true expectations. 279 Thus,
"forecast error" can be decomposed into a "true" forecast error component and a ''bias" component. The "true" forecast error component, reflecting post-forecast macroeconomic shock, industry
condition, and firm-specific information,2so should not expose the
274 For the use of event studies to determine materiality, see, for example,
Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
49 Bus. LAw. 545 (1994).
275 Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and
the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183, 187 (2010). See also Allen
Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule lOb-5 Causes
of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 Bus.
LAw. 163, 166, 170 (2008) (explaining that the "truth" the Dura Court is referring to is the revelation to the market, or the so-called "corrective disclosure,"
of the actionable misconduct that forms the basis for the Rule 10b-5 cause
of action).
276 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318, passim (2014).
277 See supra text accompanying note 151.
278 See Robert N. Rapp, Plausible Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss
Causation in Pleading and Proving Market Fraud Claims Under Securities
Exchange Act§ IO(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 389, 399 (2015);
see also Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (stating that
the securities statutes make private securities fraud actions available, not to
provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect
investors against economic losses actually caused by the misrepresentations).
279 Maureen McNichols, Evidence of Informational Asymmetries from Management Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns, 64 AcCT. REv. 1, 2, 6-7 (1989).
280 Id. at 19 n.17, 25. Cf. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342--43 (stating that in the loss
causation context, intervening causes such as "changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific
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forecasting issuer to liability under Omnicare's "genuinely held"
and "objectively based" standards. 281 The "bias" component, be it
management's intentional bias to misrepresent thus conflicting
with Omnicare's "actually held'' standard,282 or management's
cognitive biases thus conflicting with Omnicare's "objectively
based" standard,283 should be measured for materiality. This
facts, conditions, or other events," rather than "the earlier misrepresentation,"
may have caused all or part of the later loss).
281 See supra text accompanying notes 246-4 7, 250.
282 See supra text accompanying note 246; see also McNichols, supra note
279, at 17.
283 See supra text accompanying note 247 (discussing lack of reasonable
basis as a disjunctive test for establishing falsehood of an opinion); see also
McNichols, supra note 279, at 17 (requiring an expectation of earnings to be
both "true" and "unbiased" to qualify for true forecast error); cf. supra note 252
(arguing for a "dual falsity'' test for establishing falsehood of an opinion).
For legal literature commenting on management's intentional bias and
cognitive bias, see, for example, HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 256--58 (2015) (stating that a "blinded" or over·
confident corporate officer is capable of making misleading forward·looking
statements without deliberately intending to defraud investors, but investors
may be hurt as much or more by such misleading forward· looking statements
than by a deliberate scheme to defraud them).
For economic and accounting literature studying managerial forecasting
biases, see generally Guojin Gong, Laura Y. Li & Jeff J. Wang, Serial Corre·
lation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 677 (2011)
(concluding that management earnings forecast errors should not exhibit se·
rial correlation if managers truthfully convey their earnings expectations and
efficiently process information, i.e., management has neither intentional bias
to misrepresent nor cognitive bias); Gilles Hilary & Charles Hsu, Endogenous
Overconfidence in Managerial Forecasts, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 300 (2011)
(documenting that managers' self·serving attribution cognitive bias led to
less accurate forecasts subsequent to a series of accurate predictions); Paul
Hribar & Holly Yang, Does CEO Overconfidence Affect Management Fore·
casting and Subsequent Earnings Management? (Mar. 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), http://web·docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/accounting/docs/Summer
_Camp/Hribar.Yang,Does.CEO.Overconfidence.Affect.Mgmt... pdf [https://perma
.cc/6PU2·VVUH] (concluding that overconfident managers are more likely to
issue optimistically biased forecasts); Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C.
Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Mis·
reporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311 (2012) (concluding that overconfident ex·
ecutives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely
to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements, possibly
to the degree of fraudulent intent within the meaning of SEC Rule 10b·5). &e
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Article recommends the abandonment of the CSRC's current
20 percent/50 percent forecast error policy (i.e., "public apology"
and related penalties for a 20 percent ex post over-projection
and a "three-year offering ban'' for a 50 percent ex post overprojection2B"-itself a biased enforcement policy indeed). In lieu
thereof, it recommends the adoption of a "random error versus
bias" decomposition approach to assess materiality of an ex ante
untrue projection. 285
also Hirst et al., supra note 189 (citing managers' varied economic incentives
to issue upward or downward biased forecasts).
284 See supra note 267. In 1975, the SEC solicited comments on "whether
specific percentage tests of materiality should be adopted for projections and,
if so, what percentage would be appropriate." See Future Economic Performance Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,317-18.
285 See McNichols, supra note 279, at 22; see also Janet Cooper Alexander,
Rethinking Damages in &curities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1498
n.39 (1996) ("[P]rojections or statements about the future can turn out to be
wrong through bad luck or bad judgment as well as fraud."); Healy & Palepu,
supra note 6, at 423 (commenting that the legal system will be penalizing
forecasts made in good faith if it cannot effectively distinguish between unexpected forecast errors due to chance and those due to deliberate management bias); cf. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 n.9, 238-39 (applying a
probability/magnitude test of materiality to contingent or speculative information or events such as preliminary merger negotiations, but noting "[w]e
do not address here any other kinds of contingent or speculative information,
such as earnings forecasts or projections.").
For the use of the "statistically significant" concept to determine "materiality"
in the securities fraud context, compare Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller,
Fraud on the Marhet Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 507--00
(2006) (noting that in an efficient market, if the price impact of a misleading
information (or a corrective disclosure) is statistically insignificant, then the information (or the disclosure) is immaterial at that time; in an inefficient market, such a direct link between materiality of the information to the average
market participant and the stock price response to the information does not necessarily hold), with Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321
(2011) (stating that, in assessing the materiality of drug adverse event reports
for disclosure purposes under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the reports' statistical significance or lack thereof is not dispositive of every case; and that a
"fact-specific'' inquiry into the source, content, and context of the reports is
required (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 236)). Under the "random
error vs. bias" decomposition approach proposed in this Article, only the price
impact attributable to the bias component at the time of the earnings projection should be tested for materiality, by statistical significance or otherwise.
See supra text accompanying notes 240-41, 246--4 7, 272--83. Where an earnings
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CONCLUSION

Issuer forecasting fares with striking differences under the
two regimes. In the United States, issuer earnings forecasts are
discretionary.2B6 In China, earnings forecasts are mandatory for
issuers whose expected earnings meet regulator-set risk or volatility benchmarks, who use offering proceeds for significant asset
purchases, or who effect a related party Significant Assets Restructuring (SAR).2B7 In the United States, the forecasting issuers are exposed to private litigation risk,2BB but are also shielded
by safe harbors and demanding liability standards. 2B9 In China,
projection is found materially false ex ante, proof of any economic loss in a
private fraud action should also be subject to such a "random error vs. bias''
decomposition test, to wring out any market loss which may be reflected in the
realized earnings report. &e, e.g., Dura, 544 U.S. at 343, 345; Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (citing Dura, 544
U.S. at 342--43) ("Loss causation ... requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the market price also caused a
subsequent economic loss .... If one of those [intervening] factors were responsible for the loss or part of it, a plaintiff would not be able to prove loss
causation to that extent."). For calculation methodologies, see generally Allen
Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Forward-Casting lOb-5 Damages: A Comparison to Oth2r
Methods, 37 J. CORP. L. 365, 366--67, Part V (2012) (proposing a forwardcasting method in place of the back-casting methods for estimating Rule lOb-5
damages, and stating that the analysis is also useful in determining whether
the misinformation was "material").
286 See supra text accompanying note 20.
287 See supra Parts LA, I.B, I. C.
288 There are eight express private rights of action under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, and four implied private causes of action under the
Exchange Act; most relate to material misrepresentations and omissions. See
Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of th£
Effect of th£ PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims,
76 WASH. U. L. Q. 537, 541 n. 7 (1998).
288 The statutory safe harbor requires a private plaintiff to prove that the
defendant acted "with actual knowledge" of the falsity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z2(c)(l)(B), 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (2012). Even if a defendant fails the safe harbor, for
the plaintiff to prevail on a Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 general antifraud
private action, it must plead and prove six elements, including scienter
proven by "a strong inference." See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (stating that Section lO(b) was designed as "a catch-all clause'' for fraud); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)) (setting forth six elements a plaintiff
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the securities laws provide no express or implied private right of
action to investors on account of fraudulent forward-looking
statements; 290 nor do the securities laws provide any safe harbor
to the forecasting issuers. 291
Instead, issuer forecasts are regulated by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange according to their respective jurisdictions and respective standards. 292 Public enforcement of issuer
forecasts is effected via a confidential Central Fidelity File System, which scores and records any substantial discrepancies between an issuer's forecasted earnings and realized earnings, and
the CSRC and other government agencies mete out regulatory and
administrative rewards and penalties based on the ex post accuracy or inaccuracy of an issuer's projections. 293
Most notable is the CSRC's "20 percent/50 percent" rule: an
issuer with a 20 percent ex post over-projection must offer public
apologies, and an issuer with a 50 percent ex post over-projection
shall be denied access to the public offering market for a period of three years-unless exonerated by the CSRC on an undefined "force majeure" ground. Complementary to the stick is the
carrot: an issuer with ex post accurate earnings projections will
be granted favorable treatment when it applies for a securities
offering.294 Empirical data sampled by this Article analyzing the
must prove in a typical Section 10(b) private action: "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (defining "scienter'' as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud."); Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)
(holding that a "strong'' inference of scienter is one that is "more than merely
plausible or reasonable" but is "cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent."). Even though Section 11 liability
against issuers is "virtually absolute," it is "no small task" for investors to
prove an issuer's unfulfilled opinion misleading. &e Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council
Contr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1332 (2015).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 212-27.
291 See supra Part II.B.l.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 153--63.
293 See supra text accompanying notes 204-11.
294 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 128.
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FY 2013 earnings forecasts by Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchange listed issuers show that more than 50 percent were issued ex post facto in 2014. 295 Empirical literature reviewed by this
Article has noted listed issuers' use of government subsidies to
meet regulatory requirements or market expectations. 296 This
Article argues that issuers' strategic forecasting behavior and
earnings management may have been induced by regulators' accounting number-based ex post accuracy policy.
To regulate the Chinese listed issuers' earnings forecasts and
other forward-looking disclosure, this Article recommends the
construction of a legal framework that is fair, open, and transparent. Underlying the legal framework could be a centralized,
CSRC-administered issuer disclosure and reporting system for
both historical and forward-looking information, to ensure a level
playing field for issuers listed on the SHSE (which features large,
state-controlled issuers) and those on the SZSE (which features
private entrepreneur-controlled issuers).297 One pillar supporting
the legal framework should be an open and independent judicial
system, to be recognized by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and a meaningful express private right of action
to investors on account of fraudulent forward-looking information, to be written into the Securities Law of the People's Republic
of China. Not only does public enforcement by the confidential
Central Fidelity File System fail to provide economic compensation
to investors, but such a confidential system also creates an information asymmetry between investors and regulated entities and
increases the risk of regulatory capture.29B Equally important is
the other pillar of the legal framework: a safe harbor for forwardlooking statements conditional on an advance audit review. As
the literature demonstrates, the market benefits from informational intermediaries' monitoring role, and investors and issuers
alike benefit from increased amounts of quality corporate disclosure in the marketplace.299

See supra text accompanying note 152; supra Table 3.
See supra text accompanying note 178.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
298 See supra Part II.B.2.
299 See supra text accompanying notes 3--6; supra Part II.B.l.
295
296
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This Article also recommends an ex ante versus ex post perspective as a theoretical guide to the legal framework and the disclosure system. With respect to voluntary earnings projections or
discretionary disclosure in general, economic theory has espoused
an economically efficient disclosure regime.300 This Article argues
that, rather than requiring issuer ex ante disclosure of assumptions and ex post disclosure ofvariances,30l it is more meaningful
to require an ex ante audit review of issuer's material assumptions together with an ex ante issuer's disclosure of probabilistic
statements.302 Similarly, rather than imposing "a duty to update"
a voluntary disclosure thus converting a voluntary disclosure act
into a mandatory continuous disclosure obligation, 303 it would better encourage voluntary disclosure to have a mechanism that allows issuers to make efficiency-based voluntary disclosure choices,
such as a requirement for a timely issued current report to disclose
discontinuance of projections. 304
The Chinese legal system may benefit from the U.S. legal theory enunciating the "untrue statement of ... fact" in an opinion.305
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's Omnicare standard, an opinion
which ex ante (i.e., at the time of its making) was actually held
and reasonably based-as viewed from the perspective of a reasonable investor-precludes liability, even though the opinion
was erroneous ex post. An opinion which ex ante was either not
genuinely believed or not reasonably based triggers liability
(assuming materiality).306
In contrast to Basic's reasonable investor test for materiality
of a misrepresentation or omission, 307 the Chinese securities laws
adopt a market price test for materiality of certain current events
See supra text accompanying notes 182--87.
See supra text accompanying notes 22, 61, 135; supra note 26.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 195--98.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 23--26, 30, 134.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 187--89.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 240-48.
306 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1326--29 n.6 (2015); cf. supra note 252.
307 See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231--32, 240; see also supra text accompanying note 270; 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2016) (defining the term "material"),
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2016) (defining the term "material"); cf Booic, 485 U.S.
at 232 n.9.
300

301
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specified by the Securities Law.sos To assess the materiality of an
ex ante false earnings projection (and proof of economic loss attributable to an earnings projection materially false ex ante),
this Article proposes a "random error versus bias" decomposition
approach, to separate the ex post random error component from
the ex ante management bias component. It suggests that, consistent with Omnicare's fact-opinion dichotomy and fact-opinion
possible mutual embedment, only the management bias component of the forecast error--be it management's intentional bias
to misrepresent or cognitive biases-should be subject to the
"untrue statement of a material fact" analysis. soa
Debate in economics and finance literature over the relative
virtues of public versus private enforcement310 has not examined
the China phenomenon. In this Article, the Author argues against
enforcement solely by the government pursuant to a confidential
and discretionary Fidelity regulation regime. The Article recommends a conditional private right of action to supplement public
enforcement against materially false or misleading forwardlooking statements. Further sophistication of the Chinese issuers
and investors, as well as China's legal system, may provide a new
ground to test the public versus private enforcement theories.

See supra text accompanying notes 229, 271.
See supra text accompanying notes 268--85.
310 Compare R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes & A. Shleifer, What Works in
Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (arguing that securities laws matter not
because of public regulatory enforcement, but because of extensive disclosure
requirements and standards of liability to improve market discipline and private litigation), with Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207
(2009) (arguing that resource-based public enforcement is regularly associated
with deeper securities markets, as strongly as is disclosure, and that there is
no significant evidence that private enforcement liability standards play a role
in developing financial markets).
308
309
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